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IINTRODUCTION 
INTERESTED PARTIES AND POLITICS
On June 15, 1929* President Herbert Hoover signed the 
Agricultural Marketing Act into law bringing to a close 
eight years of intensive work by many people interested in 
the farm problem. Thus, the President had redeemed a 
campaign pledge to call a special session of Congress and 
secure a far-reaching piece of farm legislation. The course 
of agricultural relief, from its origin in the farm depression 
to the enaction of the new law, was influenced by practical 
politicians, professional farm representatives, and economic 
theorists. Each group had an impact on the final solution.
The fact that the problem existed and the urgency of 
the problem was generally recognized in 192 8. Alfred E.
Smith, the Democratic nominee for President, noted that 
between 1921 and 1927, the value of industry had increased 
by fifty-six per cent, while the value of agriculture had 
decreased by thirty-six per cent. Furthermore, the operating
p
costs of the farmer had increased by sixty-two per cent.
Most Republican leaders agreed that the farmer had
^New York Times, June 15 , 192 8.
\
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2
problems. Most observers agreed that since the post-war 
deflation of '1920-1921, the American farmer had been in 
serious trouble. The price received for his crops had 
dropped drastically, but the price of goods and services he 
used had remained the same or increased. The chief causes 
of the farm distress seem to have been overproduction, the 
inflation-deflation cycle of World War I, and the generally
3
rising cost of living. In an attempt to develop the 
countervailing power to help him deal with his problems, the 
farmer, as had many other groups, organized agricultural 
associations. There were three main types of farm groups: 
political pressure organizations, marketing cooperatives, 
and general associations.
The most important general associations were the Farm 
Bureau, the Farmers’ Union, and the Grange. The oldest of 
these was the National Grange, which was founded by Oliver 
Hudson Kelly in 1867.^ By the 1920’s its official doctrine
2 lb id., June 11, 1928. It was interesting to note that 
several Republicans were skeptical. Dr. Hubert Work, who 
became Hoover's campaign manager, said that he did not believe 
that the farmer was really in trouble. (New York Times,
July 4, 1928) Senator George Moses of New“Tfampshire agreed, 
adding that the sale of lumber and farm implements was up in 
the farming regions. (New York T iirie s, August 22 , 19 28.)
3
George F. Warren and F. A. Pearson, The Agricultural 
Situation: the Economics of Fluctuating Prices (New York:
J. Wiley and Sons, 19 2 4X7 pp. 19-21~and 87. For further 
background information on the general situation see Murray 
Reed Benedict, Farm Policies of the U.S., 1790-1950 (New 
York: Twentieth” Century Fund, 195SJi ~~
^Solon Justus Buck, The Granger Movement; a Study of 
Agricultural Organization and Its Po1itical, Economic,and 
Social Manifestations: 1870-1880 (CambrTclge: Harvard 
University Press, 1933), p. 53. '
3stressed the need for the farmer to help himself and not rely
5
on the government for assistance. This position made the 
Grange the most conservative of the major groups. The Grand 
Master of the National Grange, L. J. Taber, in his testimony 
at the Senate hearings, said that the Grange was active in 
thirty-three states through eight thousand subordinate 
branches, comprising 800,000 members.^ Taber, in a speech 
given during the special session of Congress, stated that the 
Grange supported the export debenture program, and proposed 
revisions of the tariff laws which would be favorable to the 
farmer.^
The newest and largest of the three farm organizations 
was the American Farm Bureau Federation. It was founded in 
1919 as an attempt to recruit all farmers into a super-organi­
zation, and received the supportboth organizationally and 
financially of the business community and government. The 
founders hoped to create a less radical, better organized
g
group to help stabilize the farm situation. In the mid­
twenties, the Farm Bureau’s support of the McNary-Haugen Bill
^New York Times, April 20, and June 17,19 28.
fi
U.S., Congress, Senate Committee on Agriculture and 
Forestry, Farm Relief Legislation, 71st Congress, 1st Session, 
1929, p. 510. Hereafter cited as Senate, Farm Relief.
^New York Times, June 17 , 1929 .
8Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Twentieth Century 
Populism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1951),
p. 255. Hereafter cited as Saloutos and Hicks, Populism.
A good history of the Farm Bureau Federation is outlined' in 
Chapter IV of this book.
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4caused a partial separation from the non-farm interests which
had been important early in its development. The Farm Bureau
continued its support of the equalization fee idea through the
9campaign of 1928 and into the Special Session of 1929. At 
this time, Sam H. Thompson, President of the American Farm 
Bureau Federation, told the Senate Committee on Agriculture 
that his organization was active in forty-two states and had a 
million members, who were engaged in all types of farming.^ 
The smallest of the three general organizations, consi­
dered by most people to be the most radical, was the Farmers’ 
Educational and Cooperative Union. It had been founded in
1902 by Isaac Newton Greshem, and became known for its
11aggressive policies. The Farmers' Union was undergoing 
a tremendous internal struggle in 1928-29. One faction 
within the Farmers' Union believed that the farmer could 
only help himself through cooperatives, while the other 
maintained that government help in securing "cost of produc­
tion" price was essential. The latter group apparently held 
the majority position, but the organization as a whole 
played a relatively unimportant roll in charting the course
New York Times, June 8, 9, 10, 1928; Senate, Farm 
Relief, pp. 28-37; and U.S., Congress, House, Committee on 
Agriculture, Hearings on Agricultural Relief, 71st Congress, 
1st Session, 19 29, pp. 7-27. Hereafter "cited as House, 
Hearings.
^^Senate, Farm Relief p. 28. r
11Soloutos and Hicks, Populism, p. 217. The history 
of the Farmers' Union is covered in Chapter VIII of this book.
5
12of the proposed farm relief.' Many of the Union’s officials 
spoke out on a personal basis, but none represented the group.
The general farm organizations had official policies of 
noninvolvement in partisan-politics, but each maintained ex­
tensive lobbying services which ultimately helped shape the 
outcome of the farm relief effort. There were, however., other 
groups whose major purpose was clearly political pressure.
They were usually organized within geographic areas or around 
specific crops. Foremost among these were the Corn Belt Federa­
tion and its political action arm, the Committee of Twenty-
two. Whatever the specific goals of the pressure group, they
13were to be reached through nonpartisan political activity.
The Corn Belt Committee or Corn Belt Federation was
typical and perhaps the most successful of this type of group.
It was formed in 1925 specifically to lobby for the McNary-
Haugen proposal then in C o n g r e s s . B y  1928 the Federation
was made-up of thirty-two farm organizations in fourteen
midwestern states, with a combined total membership of over 
15one million. The national political conventions of 1928 
provided a convenient springboard for the Federation, which 
made full use of it. National attention was focused on the 
farm problem as the Federation announced its positions on
^ Ibid♦, p . 238.
^ New York Times, September 1 , 192 8.
^Saloutos and Hicks, Populism, pp.- 385-6.
^^New York Times, September 1, 1928.
6the various.candidates and platform proposals of both 
political parties.^
In 1926 the Corn Belt Federation formed a separate organi­
zation, the Committee of Twenty-two, presumably as an action
17group for the Federation. ■ The new group was headed by
George N. Peck, a well known farm lobbyist, and was made up of
18two delegates from each of eleven midwestern states. Peek 
and his committee were very active in the campaign of 1928.
Political pressure tactics and lobbying were restricted 
to the first two types of farm associations, however. The 
third type of organization did not maintain any employees 
for legislative activities at the national level, and seldom 
at the state level. If a specific legislative proposal 
effected one of the groups, it might send an officer or an 
executive secretary to testify at a hearing, but that was 
the extent of their national lobbying.
The third major type of farm organization was the 
marketing association. There were more than twelve thousand 
cooperatives in operation in the United States in 1929, and
19nearly every commodity had one or more marketing association.
~^New York Times, June 1, 1928.
17Saloutos and Hicks, Populism, p. 389.
18The eleven States were Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, 
and Wisconsin. New York Times, July 29, 1928. See also 
Gilbert Courtlan<T~Fite, George N . Peek and the Fight for Farm 
Parity (Norman: University oT~ Oklahoma Press, 19 54).
19Lincoln Star (Lincoln, Nebraska) March 13, 19 29.
'\
7As a group, however, they were not politically effective
during this period because of the diversity of interests
they represented, and their lack of political orientation.
Despite the fact that many farmers belonged to one or
more .of these associations, by far the most important groups
interested in farm relief were the two political parties.
The agriculture question became central to the campaign of
1928 when both political parties declared it to be the most
2 0important issue. Promises were made and new alliances
were formed during the campaign which would change the course
of farm relief legislation. The political importance of the
issue came into sharp focus in the national conventions of
1928. The Republicans met first. The events before and
during that convention thrust the farm issue into the
prominent position which it was to hold until the election.
The action which caused the spotlight to fall on the
farmer was President Coolidge’s veto of the McNary-Haugen Bill
in mid-May. Farm leaders were so outraged at this betrayal
by the President that all agreed when Adam McMullen, the
Governor of Nebraska, called for an army of farmers to go
to the convention in Kansas City and make their feelings
21known to the Republican leaders. Coolidge had added insult 
to the veto by his harsh condemnation of the central ideas
^Gilbert Courtland Fite, "The Agricultural Issue in the 
Presidential Campaign of 1928n. The Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, XXXVII (March, 1951), p. 653.
^ N e w  York Times, May 24 , 192 8.
\
8of tlie bi 11. The Mew' York Times considered the vio 1 enee o£ 
his message' out of character for the '’cool” Coolidge, and
2 2speculated that he might have been politically motivated.
Reaction to the veto crystalized around Governor McMullen
when he passionately evoked the farmers to "arise as crusaders
of old . , . and go to the convention one hundred thousand
2 3strong. McMullen's farm crusade and its activities in
Kansas City received national publicity and created a climate
which insured that farm relief was to be the major topic at
the convention.
Much of the pre-convention publicity focused on the farm
groups and their march on Kansas City. Time reported that
there were overtones of Coxey's Army in the vision of the 
24Governor. McMullen quickly responded that he wanted the
farmers to meet in Kansas City and not march through the
countryside like a "circus parade". Soon after that
statement, the Nebraska governor withdrew entirely from
leadership of the farmers f march and was replaced by
2 5Governor A. G. Sorlie of North Dakota. The new leader 
called for caravans to be made up of new cars, arid for the 
farmers to look prosperous. He said, "We are going down there
22Ibid., May 24, 25, and 27, 1928.
23Ibid., May 24, 1928.
"Fee, Fie, Foe, Farmers", Time, June 4, 1928, p. 10. 
New York Times, June 5, and June 8, 1928.
\
9to demand justice for agriculture. This isn’t going to be
2 6a tattered mob, pleading for bread.”
Leaders of the farmers 1 march were confident upon the
eve of the convention. Mark Woods, of Lincoln, Nebraska,
predicted that one hundred-thousand "orderly but determined”
2 7farmers would arrive at. the eon.ven t i on . The Chamber of
Commerce of Kansas City reported that it had arranged for
five thousand rooms in private homes and for camping in
2 8public parks, if that became necessary. If huge numbers
of farmers had, in fact, ever planned to attend the convention,
they must have changed their minds. Time reported that the
center for the farmers'march had only fifteen cars parked
near it and had registered only one hundred farmers after
29the first day of the convention." There were undoubtedly 
more farmers and farmer representatives than that at the 
convention, but the actual number must have created a great 
deal of embarrassment for those who predicted one hundred 
thousand crusaders. Those who did go to Kansas City made 
their presence felt by marching on the convention, lobbying 
individual delegates, testifying before the platform committee, 
and presenting a minority farm platform to the convention.
26Ibid., June 8, 192 8.
27Ibid., June 9 , 1928 .
28Ibid■, June 10, 1928.
29"Farmers: Politics v. Economics,” Time, June 25,
1928, p. 15.
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All of these activities were coordinated by the Committee for 
30that purpose."
Before the convention was under way, the nomination of
Herbert Hoover was a certainty, so the farmers spent most of
their time trying to influence the platform. They believed
that a Republican President could not ignore their program
if it was incorporated in official party policy. There
were three groups interested in the agricultural sections of
the platform. The administration’s workers wanted the document
to support the Coolidge veto of the McNary-Haugen Act, and 
31little more. The Hoover supporters were anxious to have
a platform that would hold the farming areas and still be
32comfortable for their candidate. The farm pressure groups
were working for a platform which would pledge as much as
possible for the farmer, including the equalization fee
33sections of the McNary-Haugen Act. The first two groups
were not in conflict and were certainly sympathetic to one
another, so, in the end, the administration supporters and
34the Hoover forces wrote the 1928 Republican platform.
i
^ New York Times, June 3, 10, 14, 1928.'
^O.G. Villard, "The Elephant Performs at K.C.,,f 
Nat ion, June 27 , 1928 , p. 711.
32Evening State Journal (Lincoln, Nebraska), June 8, 
and 9 , I9T8^ [TTereaf ter cited as State Journa 1) and New York 
Times, June 10 , 192 8.
^ nRes Publicae,” Time, May 28, 1928, p. 9.
34State Journal, June 1, 192 8.
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The campaign document took up the farm problem under two 
headings: agriculture and tariff. The latter section re­
affirmed the principle of protection and discussed the im­
portance of the tariff to general prosperity. A generally 
high standard of living in the United States was the greatest 
aid lo the farmer, and therefore, a continuation and extension 
of the existing policy would be in his best interest. The 
agricultural section briefly recognized the farm problem, 
outlined the previous Republican aid to the farmer, and 
proposed to put farming on an equal basis with industry by 
affording greater tariff protection and reorganizing the 
market system. The new marketing system was to be organized 
through cooperatives and stabilization corporations, directed
3 6by a federal farm board and financed by the federal government,‘ 
The passage of this platform, which contained little the farm 
spokesman had advocated, caused the collapse of the farm 
crusade. Its principle candidate for the Presidency, William 
Lowden, ex-governor of Illinois, withdrew his name from 
consideration, and the disorganized farm groups had little 
impact on the nomination.
Contemporary analysis of the Republican Convention was 
varied. Some observers like Senator McNary of Oregon pre-
35Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, National 
Partv Platforms 1840-1960 (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1961J , pp. 282-283.
56Ibid., 285-286 .
dieted that the American farmer would support. Hoover on 
37election day. Others were certain that the farmer would
38once again support a third party movement, Some observers 
predicted a switch to the Democratic party by the agricultural 
Midwest. In fact, the National Chairman of the Democratic 
Party invited the farm leaders to the Democratic convention 
and promised them better treatment than they had received
3Q .
from the Republicans.
The farmer indeed found himself in a very advantageous
position during the Democratic National Convention of 1928.
Time characterized the meeting as being divided into two
groups: ". . . lean hungry Senators and Representatives
from the South and West . . . and . . . jovial, well-fed
40city bosses from the North and East.” The Convention was 
badly split over the issues of religion, machine politics, 
prohibition, and the nomination of Smith. The city bosses 
of the party were agreed on a candidate, and they held the 
power to control the convention.^ These hard-headed politicians 
knew that they needed support from outside their own areas,, 
so they made every effort to build strength in the Midwest.
37New York Times, June 17, 1928.
38Ibid., June 9, 10, 1928.
30Ibid., June 14, 1928.
"National Affairs: The Democracy," Time, June
25, 1928,p . 8.
13
Their appeal started with the invitation extended by the
National Chairman to the farm representatives. It continued
when the keynote speaker, Claude G. Bowers, demanded that,
” . . .  the hand of privilege be taken out of the farmers'
4 2pocket and off of the farmers' throat." Every effort was
made to put the spotlight on the farm issue and take it off
of the problem issues of prohibition, religion, and machine 
43politics. These issues, however, were of primary importance
throughout the election period. Few other issues were as
44 I ■important. Despite the intended use of;the farm issue as
{1
a red herring, leaders of all agricultural organizations went
to the convention with a great deal of optimism, and they
1
apparently were able to influence the character of the
45 IDemocratic platform. /
1
Many delegates had called for a strokg agriculturalI
plank to split the Republican power in the Midwest. Repre-
sentative Henry T. Rainey, of Illinois, ajbked for adoption|
of the McNary-Haugen principle, while Senator Pat Harrison
(
^ New York Times, June 23, 1928. j
4 3Ti • j !Ibid. j
4 4 fThe best coverage of the Democratic convention and
the issues before it is to be found in the Nation. See the
following articles : James Cannon Jr., "Ajl Smi th--Cathol ic ,
Tammany, Wet," Nation, July.4 , 1928 , pp. 19-10; L.S. Gonnett,
"Big Show at Houston," Nation, July 11, 11928 , pp. 34-5; L. S.
Gonnett, "It's all A1 Smith," Nation, Jully 4, 1928 , p. 8.I
New York Times, June 11, 23, 24, ajnd 25, 1928.
V-iic*
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of Missouri called for a plank that would pledge strong and
A
quick action. ' One of the most interesting pleas came from 
James. W, Gerard, Treasurer of the Democratic National Com­
mittee. He noted that the party had been defeated on the 
tariff issue many times and concluded that the Democratic 
Party should recognize the popular support and not oppose 
the protection program. He argued that the benefits of the
tariff which had been unequally distributed, should be extended
47to the farmer. Support from the delegates, combined with
farm lobbying had an impact on the Democratic Resolutions
Committee. The program presented to that committee was the
48same as had been advocated at the Republican convention.
Ideas of the agricultural representatives were adopted
almost completely, which caused the Evening- State Journal to
comment that the platform ” . . .promised agriculture nearly
everything a democratic convention could offer without
49endorsing a republican bill." The fan®, plank was one of 
the longest of the entire platform and included an indictment 
of the Republican farm policy. It charged): that the Repub­
licans had supported only the reduction off output as a remedy 
which would force millions of farmers int® the already 
crowded cities. One of the sections seeisasdR to call for a
46lb id., June 22, and 24 , 1928.
47Ibid., June 22 , 1928.
4h b i d . , June 24, 1928 , and June 2&A. 1928.
State’ Journal, June .29 , 192 8.
15
*
program designed to extend tariff equalization to the
farmers., but was not specific about how this was to be
50accomplished and was inserted most unobtrusively. The 
platform further called for ending special privilege in 
tariff matters, developing cooperatives, and reorganizing 
the marketing system. The farm plank stated that any program 
must include four things: credit aid to cooperatives, reduc­
tion of the difference between farm price and consumer price, 
consideration of the farmer in new tax laws, and a new farm 
policy under the direction of a federal farm board analogous 
to the Federal Reserve Board.^
The agricultural plank was well received by organizations 
and political leaders alike. Senator Harrison of Mississippi,
called it a ’’forward declaration” which would add some tra-
5 2ditionally Republican states to the Smith column. Senator,
Carraway of Arkansas characterized the plank as a recognition
of the McNary-Haugen principle which would insure Democratic
5 3success in the fall. Governor McMullen gave the platform 
his whole-hearted approval, commenting that the farm organi­
zations should approve because it endorsed the McNary- 
Haugen principle. McMullen, however, refused to endorse
5 0The American Farm Bureau was to charge later in the 
campaign that many rural newspapers printed the Democratic 
platform without this section. An investigation was promised, 
but no results were published. New York Times, July 7, 1928.
^Porter, Platforms, pp. 2 72-3.
^ N e w  York Times, June 29 , 1928.
5 3Ibid. \
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S A
Smith - and said that he preferred to "wait and see".“ ' Farm
organization leaders also announced their approval of the
Democratic platform. George Peek and Sam H. Thompson gave
statements indicating great support for the farm plank.
They also refused to support Smith directly, but at the same
time, left no question of Iheir preference for the Democratic 
55nominee.
Comments about the Democratic Convention were mixed.
George Peek expressed confidence that the strong farm plank
would overcome Midwestern reluctance for the "wet” Catholic
son of the Tammany Tiger. ^  More conservative observers
like Governor Christiansen of Minnesota said that there was
little or no likelihood that the traditionally Republican
57farmers of his state would bolt the party for Smith. The
most realistic and honest observers like L.S. Gonnett of the
Nation very candidly said that the real issues of the election
were prohibition, Catholicism, and Smith’s ties to big city
5 8machine politics. These issues were not likely to produce 
a trend against Hoover in the farm states.
54Ibid., June 30, and July 3, 1928.
"’hbid. , June 28 , 29, 30 , and July 3, 1928. Edgar
0 ’Neill of-the Farm Bureau and Gray Silver of the Farmers’
Union, also endorsed Smith in this period.
56Ibid., June 23, 1928.
57Ibid., July 7, 1928.
r o
L.S. Gonnett, "Big Show at HoUsrton, ” Nation,
July 11, 1928, pp. 34-5.
h
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Following the convent ions, the Midwest was commonly
character!zed as being in open revolt against Hoover. The
Republican party would apparently be forced to spend time
53and money in this region as never before h' However, by
late July the ’’corn belt revolt" was pronounced "disMpated".,
and the manager of the Hoover campaign in the West, James W.
Good, announced that he thought the Midwest would remain
Republican, "with a minimum of difficulty Senator
Brookhart went further and announced that the region presented
61no contest for the Republicans. Only the most die-hard of
the Smith Supporters continued to hold any public hope of a
real break betiveen the grain farmers and the Republican party.
The Hoover strategy was calculated to take advantage of
the traditional Republicanism of the Midwrestern farmer. The
campaign text pointed out that control in Congress had been
in the hands of agricultural representatives and that the
6 2interest of the farmer.1.'had been well served. The virtue 
of party regularity was preached, publicly and privately, and 
had its impact on the politicians of the region. Very few 
Republican governors, senators, or representatives, ultimately 
refused to support Hoover, despite their previous opposition
q Q
lb id., July 29, 1928. The New York Times editorially 
suggested that the best place for the Republicans to spend 
their campaign funds would be on the Grain Exchange in 
Chicago. New York Times , August 10 , 1928.
^ lb id., September 1 , 1928.
^ Ibid., September 6 , 1928.
^ I b  id. , September 4, 1928. \
18
to his nomination. One of the first politicians to announce
his support of the party nominee was Senator McNary. of Oregon,
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture.. McNary said/
soon after the convention, that he had met with Hoover finding
the Secretary of Commerce sympathetic and anxious to help the
farmer. The Senator believed that the platform program would
certainly help the agricultural situation by forming a base
for further.Congressional action.^ Reconciliation between a
Senator closely tied to farm relief programs and nominee
Hoover,under-scored the vital nature of political regularity
and served as a pattern to be followed by many other figures
who had violently opposed the nomination of the Secretary of
Commerce. Most of the political leaders of the Midwest
finally came into the fold and either supported Hoover or
made no effort against him. Perhaps the most notabTer' of the
anti-Hoover group who returned to support the ticket were
Senator Smith Brookhart of Iowa,, Senator William Borah of
Idaho, Governor John Hammill of Iowa and Governor McMullen.
In fact, all but the Nebraska governor became strong sup-
64porters of the Republican ticket. The force of party 
loyalty was so strong that the only major Republican from
^ State Journal, June 16 , 1928.
^The background of the decision of each of these 
leaders can be easily traced through the New York Times for 
June and July, 1928. Particular emphasis was placed on 
Brookhart and McMullen. The editorial section had a good 
time with the about-face of these two figures. See the New 
York Times, July 4, 19 28, for the Brookhart editorial, and 
August 28, 1928, for the McMullen editorial.
19
the .Midwest who actually declared his support for Smith, was
6 5Senator George Norris of Nebraska. The role of politics
in these decisions was critical* but the Republican campaign
efforts must have reassured many of these leaders that
significant progress could be made with Hoover as President.
The Republican campaign followed the farm plank of the
platform exactly. Hoover emphasized the concept of improved
marketing in his speeches and promised stabilization financed
by the Federal government and controlled by farm cooperatives.^
The only real deviation from the platform and the general
post-convention strategy was the apparent result of Senator
Norris' announcement that he would support Smith. Senator
Borah had previously urged Hoover to announce that, early in
his administration, he would call a special session of
Congress to consider farm relief. Following the defection
of Norris* Hoover announced that he would follow Borah’s
suggestion, provided the upcoming short session did not
6 7deal with the issue satisfactorily. The Republican 
campaign for capturing the farm vote was based on emphasizing 
the benefits of the traditional ties in the Midwest, the 
platform program, and a promise of immediate Congressional 
attention to the relief of agriculture.
^ N e w York' Times , October 2 8, -192 8.
^See, for instance, New Yo'r'k' Times, October 7, 1928 , 
for a speech made in Elizabethtown, Tennessee.
^ N e w  York Times, October 28 and 29, 1928.
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The Smith campaign, on the other hand, was neither so
well organized, nor so successful. The problem was obvious
from the very beginning. The candidate’s support was the
Big-city, industrial vote,but it was not large enough to
carry him to the Presidency without help from other segments
of the electorate. The most obvious potential allies were
the Midwestern farmers, who were leaning away from Hoover
anyway. Smith was faced immediately and throughout the
campaign with the problem of appealing to the farmers without
alienating his urban supporters.^  The farm campaign was
characterized: by a certain vagueness and contradiction.
Smith announced his support of the party platform and the
principle of the equalization fee, but not the McNary-Haugen 
69Bill itself. He triea to clarify this position by saying
that the McNary-Haugen principle was satisfactory, but that
70the details of the bill were not. This uncertain distinc­
tion brought immediate criticism from Hoover supporters, who 
made a standard demand that Smith dispell the ambiguity of
his position and either accept the McNary-Haugen Bill or 
71reject it. About the only person who accepted Smith’s 
remarks as encouraging to the farmer was George Peek, who
^ Ibid., September 20 , 1928. See also April 9, 1928.
69 Ibid. , July 10, August 4, arid September 9 , 1928, and 
State Journal, July 10, 1928.
70New York Times, September 1, 1928.
71See for instance, New York Times, September 30, 1928.
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announced that the candidate's acceptance of the principle
was entirely satisfactory to him. and that details could be
7 2worked out later. Support of Smith proved to be a typical 
response from farm association leaders.
Peek announced his personal support for Smith about 
a month after the Democratic Convention, although it had 
been apparent since the Republican Convention that his 
sentiments were for Smith. Many other Midwestern agricul­
tural leaders also announced their support of the Democratic 
candidate. Sam H. Thompson, Chester C. Davis of the Committee
of Twenty-twro, and William Settle, were among the first to
7 3give their indorsement. In addition, many associations 
adopted resolutions favorable to the Democratic ticket. Most 
of the major organizations could not directly name a candidate 
because of internal regulations, but most made their political 
intentions perfectly clear. For instance, the annual conven­
tion of the Iowa Farmers* Union passed a resolution supporting 
the Democratic platform and closed that session by singing
^ New York Times, August 3, 1928.
7 3The only two farm organization leaders who announced 
support for Hoover were Charles Barrett, President of the 
National Farmers* Union, and Ralph Snyder, President of the 
Kansas Farm Bureau. For Barretts announcement, see New York 
Times, July 12 , 1928. It should be noted that Barrett was 
from Georgia which might suggest that factors other than 
farm relief might have influenced his decision. For Snyder's 
position see New York Times, August 20, 1928. It must be 
remembered that Kansan was the home state of Charles Curtis, 
the Republican vice presidential nominee.
\
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74,!The Sidewalks of New York," Smith’s campaign song.
The actions of the farm organizations led to a split
between the political leaders and the organization leaders
of the Midwest. The resulting alienation was spotlighted
by a bitter, public fight which broke out between George Peek
and Governor Hammill during the campaign. These two had been
friends and co-ivorkers in their previous struggle for farm
legislation, but each charged in the press that the other was
7 5unfaithful to his farm constituents. The separation of 
these two leadership groups was to have an effect when the 
farm relief program moved into Congress. Apparently, the 
split negated the impact of traditional leaders in the 
campaign, and every farmer was left to choose for himself.
The Democratic strategy for the Midwest region was based on 
the support of the farm association leaders. Inability to 
attract the average farmer without alienating Smith’s base 
of support prevented the strategy from being successful. The 
campaign effort was further hampered by the general lack of 
a positive program. Vague promises of aid to the farmer, 
coupled with a hazy stand on the symbol of farm relief, the 
McNary-Haugen Bill, made the Democratic bid for Midwestern 
support a futile effort.
74.New York Times, September 21, 1928. Other farm 
organizations which made similar commitments were: The
Missouri Farmer’s Association, The Indiana Farm Bureau 
Federation, and The Corn Belt Committee. New York Times,
July 11, 13, August 15, 17, and 30, 1928.
^ New York Times, July 30, August 6, and 7, 192 8.
\
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The election returns indicate the real hopelessness of
the Democratic campaign. Hoover received over twenty-one
million popular votes while Smith received only fifteen
million. Smith carried only eight states in the solid South
76which made the electoral vote even more one-sided. This
landslide victory was interpreted by many Republicans as a
mandate for the Hoover program in the areas of the tariff
7 7and agriculture. Election analysts do not agree with that
position, however. In fact, the negative aspects of the
silent issues of prohibition, Catholicism, and big city politics
78seem to have killed Smith’s hopes in the Midwest. Reports
from South Dakota and Nebraska about a month before the
election indicated that the greatest problem the Democratic
candidate faced was his religion. The dispatch from South
Dakota even said that Smith could sweep the state if he were
79only Protestant. The Nebraska report added that Smith's
o n
stand on prohibition had hurt his chances to carry that State. 
The Grand Island Independent concluded somewhat later, that the 
election returns showed "too conclusively" that the central
76Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Presidential Vote: 1896-
1932 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934), pp. 24-27.
^ New York Times, November 8, 1928.
7 8See Edmund D. Moore, A Catholic Runs for President: 
the Campaign o f 19 28 (New York: TFe Ronald~Press Co~. , 19 56.) ,
ancl New York Times, October 8, 1928.
7QNew York Times, October 6, 1928.
^ Ibid. , October 4, 1928.
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81issues had been religion and prohibition. The issue of big 
city machine politics got more attention before the election. 
Senator Capper of Kansas remarked that Hoover was from the 
West and understood the farmer, while Smith, being from
8 2New York City, could never understand agricultural problems.
Secretary of Agriculture Jardine commented that Tammany
representatives in Congress had always voted against farm
relief, and that Smith never carried the agricultural sections
of New York State. The Secretary concluded that Smith was a
8 3loyal son of Tammany and should not be trusted. The results,
then, probably should not have been taken as a mandate for
Hoover’s policies.
Perhaps the best analysis of the farm vote was written
by Anne O ’Hare McCormick for the New York Times. She argued
that the farm vote as a unified block did not exist because
the farmer insisted on the right to cast his ballot as a
84completely free agent. He had consistantly been guided
by his general opinion more than his special interest, and
85had influenced every issue but his own. She concluded that 
^ Ibid. , October 4, 1928.
^ Ibid., October 14 , 1928. See also New York Times , 
October 14, 1928, for similar remarks by Representative 
L. J. Dickenson of Iowa.
^^New York Times, September 2, 1928. See New York Times, 
August 24, 19 28~ for similar remarks by Joseph L. Bristow, 
former Senator from Kansas.
^Ibid. , October 14 , 1928.
85Ibid., March 31, 1928.
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o f  argur
the
that his
armor voted more from habit than from self-interest and
.1  trip to the po 11ing place'was 1 ’mos 11 y for the sake
8 6g ument a nyway; e
The reasons for Hoover’s victory in 1928 were not as im
process 'of farra relief .legislation* Probably the greatest 
result was the elevation of the Hoover program to the head 
of the list of various legislative possibilities. Of 
almost equal importance was the binding of Midwestern 
political leaders to the Hoover program and the alienation 
of the association leaders from the new President. The
t
political leaders’ support of the Republican ticket made it 
very difficult for them to oppose the administration's 
program when it was proposed in Congress. During the course 
of the campaign, farm association leaders had formed open 
alliances with the Democratic leadership, and the power of 
this coalition was entirely free of any control by the 
administration. In fact, it became the greatest obstacle 
to the Hoover program. Finally, the Hoover promise of a 
special session opened the doors of Congress to immediate and 
exclusive consideration of farm relief legislation.
portant as the impact of the campaign and election on the
86Ibid.
CHAPTER II
THE HEARINGS 
PROGRAMS
In March of 1929 , the Committees on Agriculture, of
both the House and the Senate, began hearings which were to
mold the needs of the American farmer, the programs of the
farm groups, and the promises of the politicians into pro-
posed legislation. Virtually the same effort had been made
many times before^ and committee members exhibited a sense of
weariness during the opening sessions. The chairman of the
Senate committee, Charles McNary of Oregon, instructed the
witnesses that the committee would concede that the farm
problem was -'proverbial" if they would simply explain their
2proposed solutions. Representative James Aswell of Louisiana 
remarked, on the opening day of the House hearings, that the 
Senate hearings had started two days before, and nothing new 
had been said. He suggested that the chairman ask the farm 
groups to get together, because the committee did not need to
New York Times, March 25 and 28, 1929. The Senate Com­
mittee began hearings on March 25 and the Bouse Committee 
began on March 28.
2
U.S., Congress, Senate Committee on Agriculture and 
Forestry, Farm Relief Legislation, 71st Congress, 1st Session, 
1929, p. 28. Hereafter cited as Senate, Farm Relief.
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hear the same old arguments again. Linwood Clark of Maryland
replied that the committee had been requesting that for ten 
3years. ’’The proceedings reminded one,” according to T ime,
"of an 1890 melodrama revived and played straight."^ Despite 
the lack of enthusiasm among the committee members, the 
prospects of legislation emerging from Congress and being 
approved by the President were excellent. A New York Times 
editorial stated that the Republicans had to redeem their 
campaign promises while the Democrats wanted to prove that 
they were the real friends of the farmers.^ The Omaha Bee- 
News concurred, adding that if no help was forthcoming, the 
Republicans would be charged with "cheap and disreputable 
politics."^ Charles I. Stengle, editor of the National Farm 
News, testified before the House committee, that public 
sentiment had changed. Six years before, there had been no 
public support for the farmer, but there was great contemporary 
interest which was reflected by intense political pressures.
Editors were not all optimistic, however. The Lincoln 
Star remarked that all the Congressional activity in Washington
3
U.S., Congress, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings 
on Agricultural Relief, 71st Congress, 1st Session 1929, p. 6. 
Hereafter cited as Senate, Farm Relief.
4"National Affairs: Farmers: Relief, Yet Again", Time,
April 8, 1929, p . 10.
^New York Times, April 8 , 1929.
^Omaha Bee-News (Morning Edition), June 12, 1929.
7
House, Hearings, p. 675.
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was vital, to the region, hut that the Republican leaders had
forgotten the farmer.** Every manufacturer in the country
was in Washington for the tariff hearings, according to the
New York Tiiries, but very few farmers appeared. It concluded
that the farmer had little real interest in the course of
9legislation and trusted Hoover to work for him. The
Hast.ings Democrat went further and called the farmer a "help-
10less and innocent bystander5’. Both the optimistic and 
pessimistic observers agree, however, that the time was right 
for the passage of farm legislation. Although the result 
would not emerge for nearly two months, the legislative 
process began with hearings in both committees.
The witnesses who testified reflected the diverse 
interests involved. Farmers, farm organization represen­
tatives, political leaders, executive branch spokesmen, 
representatives of business organizations, labor leaders, 
private citizens, and professional economists were all pre­
sent to attempt to influence legislation. There were sixty- 
six witnesses before the House Committee, which held nine 
sessions between March 27 and April 4 . ^  An equal number 
appeared before the Senate Committee which met from March 25
0
Lincoln (Nebraska) Star, March 17, 1929. See also 
May 9, 19 29.
9 'New York Times, March 31, 19 29. Tt should be noted
that tariff "Hearings 'were also being held in conjunction
with the Sx^ecial Session.
1 o
Hastings (Nebraska) Democrat, May 16, 1929.
1 1 House, Hearings , pp. 1-870 . v
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to April 12.^
The testimony offered'b y .these experts was as divergent
as the group itself. No one was quite as succinct as I. H.
Hull,, of the Indiana Farm Bureau, who'reported that there
13were only two problems: high costs and low prices. Much
statistical evidence was given to indicate the general plight
14
of the farmer.' Dudley G. Roe, a Maryland legislator and
wheat farmer, outlined three areas of general agreement among
farmers A First, there was a farm problem. Second, the
solution was to get rid of surplus commodities. Third, the
problem was caused by the tariff policy. He argued that the
farmer was forced to buy in a protected market, but had to
sell in the world market. If it was fair to protect the
manufacturer, then it was also fair to protect the farmer by
15making the tariff work for agriculture. These arguments 
were echoed and re-echoed through both committee rooms during 
the entire hearing period. The rational offered in support of 
the simpler solutions was that they would make.the tariff 
more beneficial to agriculture. Attacks on the basic assump­
tions of the tariff were almost completely absent from the 
hearings .
Senate, Farm Relief, pp. Ill-IV.
13House, Hear m g s , p. 2 38.
14Senate, Farm Relief, p. 5. For further statistical 
evidence see: New York Times, May 31, 1929, and Keith County 
(Ogallala, Nebraska) News, March 7, 1929.'
15House, Hear m g s  , pp. 352-357.
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Two programs for making the tariff effective on farm 
commodities were presented. Both were already familiar to 
the committee members, as well as the interested public. One 
was the export debenture program; the other was the equali­
zation fee idea. The McNary-Haugen Bills, which .had gained 
great popular support in the twenties, were built aruund the 
equalization fee. The bill had been introduced into five 
Congresses, passed by two, and vetoed twice. The plan had 
been devised by George N. Peek and Hugh S. Johnson of the 
Moline Plow Company. The Peek-Johnson plan was based on the 
assumption that if the surplus crop could be withheld from 
the domestic market to be released during slack seasons or 
sold on the world market, domestic prices could be maintained 
at a higher level. The cost of the loss incurred by buying
on the home market and selling on the world market was to be
16paid by the producers. Under the McNary-Haugen program, 
the government was to organize a huge export corporation 
which was to trade commodities on the domestic market at a 
certain ’’ratio price” . This was similar to the later parity 
price concept and was to be determined by the pre-war value 
of the commodities. The plan would stabilize' the domestic 
market at a level satisfactory to the farmer. When any 
commodity was originally sold under the program, the farmer
16Murray Reed Benedict, Farm Policies of the U.S., 
1790-19 50 (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953), pp. 208-
210. Hereafter cited as Benedict, Farm Policies.
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was to receive a certain part of the ratio price in cash and 
the rest: in script, which would be redeemed yearly for a 
percentage of its face value. The withheld portion was to
17cover the export loss and the administration of the program.
The McNary-Haugen program was so familiar to the committee
that no formal prosentation of the plan was made. Many
witnesses expressed approval or disapproval, and nearly all
were asked to evaluate the plan..
S. H. Thompson, President of the American Farm Bureau
Federation, was one of the stauchest supporters of the
equalization fee. He said that his testimony was drawn
directly from a policy resolution approved at the last annual
meeting of the Farm Bureau. He began by stating that, under
present circumstances, an American price for farm commodities
was impossible. Therefore, an American standard of living
could''not'be enjoyed by farm families. This situation could
never be improved until the entire crop was placed under the
control of "efficient marketing and distribution." Thompson
suggested that a combination of the equalization fee and
cooperative marketing associations would be necessary to
18solve the farm problem. Chester H. Gray, a lobbyist for 
the American Farm Bureau, also appeared before the House 
Committee. He stated that the members of the Farm Bureau had 
studied the equalization fee for four years before they
^ Ibid., pp. 212-213.
1 &
Senate, Farm Relief, pp. 28-29.
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19approved it, and they were not going to give it up suddenly.
When Gray was asked if he would support the McNary-Haugen bill
without the fee idea, he answered, "No". When asked if he
would accept the export debenture plan as a substitute for
20the fee, again he simply answered, "No".
The equalization fee, however, was not universally
supported in the hearings. Many witnesses passed it by in
favor of other proposals, and some actively opposed it. S. J.
Cothington, President of the Farmers Grain Dealers Association
of Iowa, and L. 0. Moser, President of the American Cotton
Growers Exchange, flatly4-;, opposed the equalization fee. C. S.
Ralston, representative of the National Potato Institute,
testified that the fee did nothing for the potato growers,
21so they were largely indifferent to the plan. Even the
committee members themselves seemed reluctant to endorse
the fee idea again. Representative Aswell took one witness
to task for wasting the time of the committee with his
22discussion of the fee. He implied that Coolidge’s veto 
of the earlier McNary-Haugen Acts had sealed the fate of the 
equalization fee. The ex-President’s vitriolic attack on the 
equalization fee must have made more than one committee 
member reluctant to try that solution again. Coolidge and
19House , Hearings, p . 9. 
20Ibid., p. 15.
21Ibid., pp. 233-234. 
22Ibid., p. 27.
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his Attorney General had argued the fee was, in fact, a sales
tax. The taxing power Constitutionally rested with Congress
and could not be shifted to a farm board. Therefore, the
measure was unconstitutional. The ex-President also believed
that the bill was unsound. He reasoned that if the program
raised prices, it would promote a gigantic surplus which
2 3would choke the entire program. The total enemity of the 
previous administration and the supposed opposition of the 
new President seemed to doom the equalization fee to 
oblivion.
Another, similar idea, the export debenture plan, was 
presented as an alternative to the equalization fee.
Although,the debenture was quite an old idea, it had received 
little Congressional attention until the Special Session.
The contemporary form of the debenture program seemed to 
be the work of Professor Charles L. Steward of the University 
of Illinois. Under his program, any exporter of an agricul­
tural commodity which was protected by a tariff, was to be 
issued a debenture credit for each bushel of the commodity 
shipped out of the country. The value of the debenture was
to be a proportion of the tariff. Any merchant could use
2 4the debenture to pay the duty on any imported item.
^JftFee, Fie, Foe, Farmers," Time, June 4 , 1928, pp. 10-11.
24Benedict, Farm Policies, pp. 226-227. As an example, 
the tariff on wheat was forty-two cents per bushel and the 
proposed debenture rate was fifty per cent. A wheat exporter 
would receive debenture credits amounting to twenty-one cents 
per bushel. Any one could then use the debentures to pay the 
tariff on any imported goods.
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Louis J. Taber, Grand Master of the National Grange ? 
appeared before both committees to support the export deben­
ture program. Most of his testimony was in the form of a
2 5written report stating the position of the National Grange. J
This paper advocated a four part program, including a system
of cooperative marketing, the export debenture program,
tariff reform, and changes in public land policy. The Grange
maintained that all four must be put into effect, because
2 6none would be really effective alone. Congress was asked
to alter the land policy by ending all programs which would
expand the amount of farm land. No more reelama-t'ibiiv£,-.%
colonization, irrigation, or drainage projects were to be
started. In addition, a program of reforestation was to be
immediately undertaken. The Grange also agreed with the idea
of expanding the cooperative marketing system which was to
reduce the distribution costs. The new system was to be
directed by a federal farm board. The Grange position would
not accept a weak or political board. The Grange did support
the debenture program, because it would reduce the surplus
without destroying the domestic price. The experience of
foreign countries had originally interested the Grange in
the debenture system, and the association considered it a
2 7"necessary complement", of the tariff system.
“^Senate,' Farm Relief, pp. 508-510.
26Ibid., pp. 509-10 .
27Ibid., p. 509.
\
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Taber, in his personal testimony, emphasized the debenture
plan. He reminded the committees that Alexander Hamilton had
endorsed the system as the only way to raise prices on exported 
23goods. Taber reported a study of the estimated cost of the 
debenture program if it had been in effect over the past five 
years. The statistics indicated that the cost would have been 
less than one hundred and fifty million dollars per year.
More than half of that total would have been paid to cotton
exporters. Tobacco, wheat, and wheat flour dealers would have
' 29been the next largest recipients. * Taber believed that the
cost was justified by the aid being given to manufacturers.
In addition, the rising farm prices would increase the pur­
chasing power of the farmer, thus aiding the manufacturer
and laborer. Further, the income tax would increase, thereby
30partially compensating for the initial expense. Taber 
concluded that he was not asking for anything the government 
was not already doing. The farmer was in need of the deben­
ture program in the same way other segments of the economy
31needed the tariff.
During the questioning session which followed Taber’s 
testimony, Senator George Harris of Nebraska stated that
28Ibid., p . 512.
29 Ibid. , pp. 514-515. The actual dollar amounts, in 
millions per year, were: cotton 89.4, wheat 20.2, tobacco
15.4, wheat flour 12.0,
30Ibid., p. 519.
31Ibid., p. 522.
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while the equalization fee put the cost oh the farmer, the
debenture program was funded by the treasury. He rhetorically
asked how anyone could expect a President, who was against
3 ?
the former, to support the latter. Representative Aswell -
asked if the Grange would accept a program without the
debenture feature. Taber replied, "We are going to continue
to fight for complete equality, but we will accept partial
3 3
equality, if we are compelled to.”
In stark contrast to the simplicity of the export deben­
ture and the equalization fee, a complex, comprehensive 
program was presented by Professor John D. Black of the 
department of economics at Harvard University. He introduced 
and explained a written report which he had prepared. The 
professor's work was predicated on the idea that the farm 
problem was not a real depression, because it was not cyclical 
in nature. He argued that agriculture had reached a new 
phase which was likely to be more or less permanent. American 
production was out of proportion to the population and had to 
readjust to this new level or find some artificial scheme to 
raise domestic prices. Black concluded that the only way to 
raise domestic prices quickly and appreciably was to use a 
combination of tariff readjustment, the export debenture plan, 
and a program called the domestic allotment.
The domestic allotment plan was a program designed to
^ Ibid. , p . 518 .
3 3
House, Hearings, p. 691.
h
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create an artifical shortage of commodities in the domestic
market. Under this plan the Department of Agriculture and
the Department of Commerce were to estimate the total demand
for a commodity during the following year. A mathematical
formula would be used to determine the amount of that crop
which could be sold under the domestic allotment program.
This amount would be slightly smaller than the anticipated
demand.^ A share of this total was then to be alloted to
each farm using a formula which was as mechanical as possible.
An individual farm share would depend on acreage, yield, and
35sales for the preceeding five years. The farmer could then
sell up to his share of the commodity in the protected
market. If a farmer raised more than his allotment allowed
him to sell, he could either purchase additional allotments
from other farmers, or sell his produce on the world market.
Any domestic processor of a commodity covered by the allotment
program must have allotment certificates, tariff receipts, or
revenue stamps equal to the amount of the tariff for all of
36the crop that he consumed. The domestic allotment program 
would create an artificial scarcity on the domestic market 
and drive the price of a covered commodity to the world price 
plus the tariff. Black considered the following advantages 
of. the program: no stimulation of overproduction, the
34 .
Senate, Farm Relief, p. 89.
 ^^ Ibid_. , p . 69 .
^ T b i d ., p . 8 5.
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allotments themselves were a source of credit and insurance, 
the portions of the crop used for feed and seed were unaffected 
the program did no harm to foreign farmers, and it was self- 
financing, He considered administrafive problems, increased 
cost of living, impossibility of new farmers entering the
37field, and limited applicability as the chief disadvantages.
Black believed that the domestic allotment program would 
be useful if applied only to wheat and cotton, because they 
were the only major crops which were largely exported. To 
raise the prices of other crops, other devices had to be used. 
He suggested higher tariff duties on certain products which 
were largely imported. Much study of the effect of substitute 
products was essential to make the tariff truly effective.
Black said that the export debenture was needed to aid 
certain kinds of products. It was to be used on commodities 
which were mainly consumed in the domestic market, but the 
exported portion was determining the market price of the 
whole crop. Black testified that these three measures taken 
together formed the best solution, because each part could 
be applied to the commodities which it was best suited to help.
Three of the four major programs presented in the 
hearings were to bring tariff equalization to the farmer. The 
fourth, which became closely identified with President Hoover, 
emphasized a different aspect of the problem. It suggested
^ Tbid. , pp. 80-81. 
^ Ibid. p. 66 and p. 70.
that orderly marketing was the best answer. The ideas which
were brought together as the administration's program were
more difficult than the previous programs to trace through
the hearings. Hoover seemed reluctant to offer a detailed
farm relief program. Secretary of Agriculture, Arthur M.
Hyde, was asked to testify as ah administration spokesman,
but he announced that he had to return to his home in
39Missouri on personal business. It appeared for awhile
that there would be no specific word from the White House
during the hearings. In the early days of the proceedings,
Senators McNary, Caraway, and Norris each said that they had
no idea of what Hoover wanted in the farm relief bill and
asked his aid in preparing legislation.^ Many newspaper
editors suspected that these agricultural-political leaders
might find it politically painful if they reported a bill
without the equalization fee unless they could tell their
41constituents that it was the President's plan. The Norfolk
Daily News, a typical paper from Nebraska, cynically remarked,
". . . Congress finds farm relief an exceedingly hot potato
and would much prefer that it be the presidential fingers, if
42anybody's, that get burned." The political pressures
■zn
New York Times, March 22 and 23, 1929.
^Senate, Farm Relief, pp. 2,4, and 18.
41See for instance; New York Times, March 22 and 25 , 1929 
Omaha World Herald, March 28, 1929; or Hastings Democrat,
April 11, 1929. “
42
Norfolk (Nebraska) Daily News, March 30, 19 29.
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generated by Hoover’s reluctance to announce a specific 
proposal seemed to be the source of the ultimate split between 
the Senate and the White House on farm relief. If Hoover had 
proposed a program similar to the one that was ultimately 
passed, much of the difficulty of the Special Session might 
have been avoided.
Despite Secretary Hyde’s personal business, he was able 
to return to Washington in time to testify before both com­
mittees. Hyde asserted that his testimony was personal and
43did not represent the views of anyone else. The New York
Times reported, however, that everyone believed that the
44Secretary was speaking for Hoover. Secretary Hyde began 
by reminding the committees that the Republican platform 
made three promises to the farmer: tariff protection, re­
duction of freight costs, and improvement of marketing.^
His testimony recited the multitude of problems facing the 
farmer. The only solution, he suggested, was to create a 
farm board with broad, general powers and very few specific 
functions to carry-out. It was to be as free as possible 
to deal with any situation.^ The farm board was without
precedent and should be allowed to work out its own methods
47through trial and error experience. The secretary was
^Senate, Farm Relief, p. 489.
44
New York Times, April 4, 19 29 . ... •
^Senate, Farm Relief, p. 490.
46Ibid. ,
Ibid. , pp. 626-627. x
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either unprepared or unwilling to be more* specific about the
farm board. He was closely questioned by several Senators,
4 8but he refused to discuss any details. Hyde did, however,
outline a marketing system which was to be heavily financed
4 9by the federal government. Money was to flow from the 
farm board to cnnperat.jves founded to stabilize specific crop 
m a r k e t s . S e c r e t a r y  Hyde’s testimony seemed to be best 
summed-up by the following statement: ’’The most I would offer
the farmer is ah instrumentality clothed with authority to 
deal with his problems, an instrumentality composed of men 
sympathetic wTith his problems.
The administration seemed intent on the creation of a 
farm board with authority and money to organize and stabilize 
the entire marketing system. A great deal of the testimony 
before the committees was given supporting or opposing 
various parts of this program, but no one except Secretary 
Hyde spoke directly for the administration.- Both the Farm 
Bureau and the National Grange had identified marketing
reorganization as an integral part of their programs, but it
5 2was a secondary issue for both groups.
48See for instance Senate, Farm Relief, pp. 493-494, 
for Senator Norris’ questioning.
49Senate, Farm Relief, p. 492.
5 0Ilouse, Hearings, p. 625.
^Senate, Farm Relief, p. 497.
^House, Hearings, pp. 13, 17-18, and 689.
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The members of the two committees then heard the pre­
sentation of two relatively simple programs of tariff reform, 
a more complex plan of tariff changes, and a rather sketchy 
program of marketing reform. None of these ideas were entirely 
new,and the committees seemed to show little enthusiasm for 
any of the programs. The consensus of opinion was that what­
ever Hoover wanted was what would ultimately pass. The 
reluctance of the Senate Committee to report a bill without 
specific guidelines from the President began to reopen old 
wounds. Hoover’s apparent refusal to cooperate with the 
committee was the major source of problems for those who 
supported farm legislation.
After the public hearings closed, the committees retired 
into executive session to consider the testimony and write 
their respective bills. These proposals, which were to be 
reported to Congress during the opening days of the imminent 
Special Session, represented the sum of the forces and needs 
which were at work during the hearings. The two committees 
emerged from executive session with different proposals. The 
Senate committee recommended the debenture program as an 
addition to the plan suggested by Secretary Hyde. The House 
committee presented a program which was quickly characterized 
as the administration’s plan.
CHAPTER III
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
THE ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM
On Monday, April 15, 1929, the Congress of the United
States met in special session. It convened in response to
a proclamation issued by President Hoover which concluded
fl. . legislation to effect further agricultural relief and
legislation for limited changes of the tariff can not in
justice to our farmers, our labor, our manufacturers be
1postponed ... * The Republican party had substantial
majorities in both houses of Congress which should have
2guaranteed easy passage of the Administration’s program. 
However, antagonism which had developed between Hoover and 
some of the farm leaders had become apparent again during 
the hearings. This lack of harmony indicated that the farm 
relief program might be contested after all. Even before the 
session opened, the New York Times reported that the House 
and Senate were likely to pass substantially different bills. 
The resulting deadlock would require strong action by the
1
U.S. Congressiohal Record, 71st Congress, 1st session, 
1929, LXXI, part 1, page 19. Hereafter cited as Congressional 
Record.
^New York Times, April 7,. 1929. See also Appendix A.
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■ 3 ' ■President to force Congress to arrive at a solution. The 
procedures of the House of Representatives, however, gave 
little indication of the growing struggle which was centered 
in the Senate. The proposed bill that was introduced into 
the lower house was popularly known as the Administration 
Plan. Its progress through the legislative procedures was 
a study in well-organized, well-oiled, power politics. The 
Republican leadership was powerful enough to move the pro­
gram through the House virtually without amendment and entirely 
without discussion of any alternative programs.
The first order of business in the House, after its 
organizational details, was to receive a message from 
President Hoover. William Tyler Page, the Clerk of the 
House, read the message which opened with the reminder that 
the Special Session had been called to consider, ". . . farm
relief and limited changes in the tariff . . . ,fT which 
represented commitments made during the 1928 campaign.^ The 
President then listed the causes of agricultural distress as 
he saw them: deflation, poor marketing systems, increased
costs, world competition, overproduction, and decreased 
consumption. ’’The general result of these problems," he wrote, 
"has been that our agricultural industry has not kept in pace 
in prosperity or standards of living with other lines of 
industry."^ Hoover emphasized that the Republican platform
3Ibid., April 13, 1929.
4Congressional' Record, p . 46 .
5lb id. X
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called for multiple solutions to the problem and that 
the people had given a special mandate for action. The 
cornerstone of the administration’s program was to be a 
federal farm board given enough money and latitude to 
help the farmer in a variety of ways. The members of the 
board were to be free of politics so that they could 
react in a logical manner to the economic forces which 
plagued the farmer. The farm board, as Hoover explained 
it, was to encourage agricultural research, guidance, and 
development. Its major function however, was to reorganize 
the marketing system. Already existing cooperatives 
were to be used and expanded to form the basis of the 
new marketing system. Federal funds were to be channeled 
from the board to the cooperatives to help them stabilize 
the marketing of farm commodities.^ The tone and con­
tent of the message should not have come as a surprise 
to anyone, as it followed the Republican platform 
and the hesitant testimony of Secretary Hyde.
Public comment on the message was surprisingly limited. 
Perhaps the most interesting was a statement released by 
Charles E. Hearst, President of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federa­
tion, and Milo Reno, President of the Iowa Farmers' Union, 
which expressed disappointment over the President's comments. 
Rend said, "If the position of Brookhart, Dickinson and some of
6 Ibid.
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these other farm relief advocates who supported Hoover weren’t
so pathetic, I would be inclined to give them a big hearty'
laugh . . . .” The statement confirmed the fact that the
split between the farm organization leaders and the farm
political leaders had not healed. There was, on the other
hand, some editorial support of Hoover and his program. For
instance, the Lincoln Star, from the representative farm
state of Nebraska, announced its approval of the President's
8program at this time. The editors of most Nebraska papers
ignored specific proposals until later in the session.
Gilbert Haugen, Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture,
introduced House Resolution One on the first day of the
special session. Its descriptive title was: "A bill (H.R.l)
to establish a Federal farm board to promote the effective
merchandising of agricultural commodities in interstate and
foreign commerce, and to place agriculture on a basis on
economic equality with other industries.” The bill was
assigned to the Committee on Agriculture, which reported it
back to the House two days later with no amendments. In
order to expedite the proceedings, the entire bill was printed
10in the Congressional Record on April 16.
7
New York Times, April 17, 1929. Reno was referring to 
Senator Smith Brookhart and Representative L.J. Dickinson. Both 
were Iowa Republicans who had supported Hoover’s election.
^Lincoln (Nebraska) Star, April 16, 19 29.
9Congressional Record, p. 27.
10Ibid., pp. 49-50.
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The opening section of House Resolution One stated that 
the purpose of Congress was to place agriculture on an equal 
basis with other industries by promoting effective marketing 
practices. This end was to be accomplished by protection, 
stabilization, and control of the marketing of farm commodi­
ties. It was the intent of Congress to encourage and finance 
marketing associations which would guide and direct the 
stabilization efforts for each crop. A federal farm board 
was to be created to carry out the policy outlined in this 
section.
Section Two of the resolution outlined the structure of 
the farm board. It was to have five members, a chairman, and 
the Secretary of Agriculture as an ex officio member. The 
members were to be appointed by the President, with the 
approval of the Senate, for six year terms. The chairman was 
to be similarly appointed to serve at the pleasure of the 
President. This section instructed the board to establish 
a main office in the Department of Agriculture in the 
District of Columbia, to hire any needed experts, and to do 
all the necessary things to begin operations.
The next two sections established the duties of the board. 
The first was to define the various commodity groups which 
would be treated under this act. The board was then instructed 
to invite the existing cooperatives in each commodity group 
to create an advisory committee to represent that crop before 
the board. The purpose of these advisory committees was to
provide expert council to the board on matters relating to
A
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the marketing of their specific commodities. The board was 
also directed to carry out several minor functions which were 
largely in the area of research, or education.
The fifth section of the bill provided for an appropria­
tion of $500,000,000 to be used as a revolving fund. Loans 
were to be made with the interest paid to the federal treasury 
while the principal was to return to the board’s revolving 
fund. Four types of loans could be made: loans to assist
’’effective merchandising” of farm commodities, loans for 
the construction or lease of physical marketing facilities, 
loans for the formation of clearing houses, and loans to help 
expand membership in cooperatives.^ The board was further 
authorized under this section, to create an insurance system 
which would prevent financial losses to marketing instruments 
through declining prices. Premiums were to be charged for 
this service, but until the system began to function profit­
ably, costs were to be paid from the revolving fund. No 
action of the board could be undertaken if it was found to 
increase the amount of crop surplus.
The sixth section provided for the creation of stabili­
zation corporations to function as the marketing instrument 
for each commodity group. These were to be legally recognized 
corporations which were wholly and exclusively owned by 
cooperative associations. The function of the stabilization
11 Ibid., p. 49. There were limitations on construction 
loans which restricted the size of the loan in relation to the 
total value of the construction. No construction was to take 
place if it duplicated existing facilities.
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corporations was to be. marketing. Tkey were to buy from the
farmers at fixed prices and store the commodity until demand
raised the market price to an acceptable level. The
stabilization corporation was central in the new marketing
12system proposed by the Committee on Agriculture.
On April 17, the bill was assigned to the Committee of
the Whole House on the State of the Union for further con- 
13sideration. The next day, the first example of the power
and organization behind this version of the bill was revealed
when an unusual rule was adopted. House Resolution Twenty-
one mapped out the entire life of the bill in the House of
Representatives. The rule directed the Committee of the
Whole to meet immediately to consider the relief bill
exclusively. Debate was to be controlled by the Chairman of
the Committee on Agriculture and the ranking minority member
of the Committee. General discussion was to end at the
adjournment of the session on April 20. The bill was then
to be read for amendment following the five^minute rule.
After the amending process, the bill was to be reported to
14the House and the previous question ordered immediately.
Representative Clarence Cannon of Missouri rose and 
passionately argued against the rule. He charged that the
12 Ibid. , p. 50. The last sections of the bill were 
basically house -keeping in nature.
"^Ibid. , p . 75 .
^ Ibid. , p . 124 .
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proposal was designed to ” . . . jam this bill through the
House . . with no opportunity for debate or amendment.
Control of time was normally given to one person in favor
and one opposed to the bill, which was not the case under
this rule. Anyone who opposed the bill or wanted to amend
it had to be granted time by a leader whu was favorable to
the bill in its present state. Cannon concluded that this
was the first time in his twenty years of service that the
15rights of a bill’s opponents had been suspended. Cannon’s 
remarks implied strong bipartisan support for the bill which 
was, in fact, revealed later. Representative Edward Pou, 
the highest ranking Democratic member of the Rules Committee, 
answered Cannon’s charges. Pou said that ample time and 
access were given for general debate. Furthermore, under 
regular rules, everyone had equal opportunity to offer any 
amendment. The resolution was then agreed to by voice 
vote.
Discussion of the measure in the Committee of the Whole 
began immediately. Chairman Haugen began by presenting the 
report of the Committee on Agriculture. The opening para­
graphs of the statement obviously had been written in answer 
to Coolidge’s veto of the McNary-Haugen measure. The report 
considered the ex-President’s objections to the previous bill 
as they related to the proposal before the House. The report
~^Tbid., pp. 127-8. 
16Ibid., p. 130.
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began, ”We believe that this program, avoids the difficulties
17on which past legislation has been wrecked.” It further
stated that the bill was clearly Constitutional, offered no
subsidy, did not put government in business, fixed no
prices, did not tax the farmer, created no bureaucracy, and
was economically sound. The report then summarized the
machinery created by the bill, emphasizing that it represented
18the maximum amount of help that the government could give.
As a personal conclusion, Haugen said that the proposal
might not do everything everyone wanted, but it provided an
instrument with sufficient latitude and backing to solve the
19problems, if the farmers would work with the board.
Haugen asked unanimous consent to disperse with the first
20reading, no one objected, and general consideration began.
The rhetoric which followed could hardly be considered 
debate. Although a few Representatives rose to criticize the 
bill, the next sessions of the House were filled by a parade 
supporting the bill. Some apparently liked the bill, but 
many supported it only because there was nothing else practical 
at that point. Representative James Aswell of Louisiana 
supported the bill and said, ”It is the best bill we can get
^ lb id. , p. 12 7.
18 , .Ibid.
19Ibid., p. 140.
20Ibid., p. 131.
"\
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21for agriculture.” He seemed to imply that nothing else
would get Hoover’s approval. Edgar Howard of Nebraska made
the implication even stronger when he announced that he
supported the bill, . . because T know it is the only bill
2 2for which I can get a chance to vote." Many of the reluctant
supporters were Democrats who also voiced an appeal for others
of their party to vote for the bill. David Kincheloe of
Kentucky stated that although he was a Democrat, he would
2 3follow the lead of the President in this matter. Repre­
sentative Aswell went further and asked his fellow Democrats
not to amend the bill. He explained that this would make
2 4the Republicans entirely responsible. Thomas Williams of
Illinois voiced the idea that the matter was economic in
nature and not political. Therefore, partisanship should
play no part in the decision. He further reminded the House
that the proposal had been prepared by the entire Committee
on Agriculture and that parts of the bill had been written
2 5by minority members of that committee.
Dispite the plea for universal support of the bill, some 
Representatives voiced their desire to include the debenture 
or equalization fee plans in the bill. Charles Adkins of
21 I b i d . , P* 129 .
2 2 ,  I b i d . , P- 47 4 .
2 3 T, • i I b i d . , P- 146 .
2 4 T -i - 1 I b i d . , P ‘ 129 .
2 5 Ti • , I b i d . , P- 128 .
\
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Illinois and Chairman Haugen of Iowa both stated that they
would prefer including the equalization fee. Adkins,
however, said that he thought Congress should go ahead
without it, because, MI think it is out of the picture for
26this session . .V Haugen added, ” . . . this seems to
2 7be no time for discussing any . . . [other] plan,. ,. .. .fC
The equalization fee and the debenture plan were both
proposed as amendments to House Resolution One. The power
and organization of administration forces were clearly shown
by the method of handling each proposed amendment. On April
24, Representative Cannon offered the equalization fee as
an amendment to the bill. Fred Purnell of Indiana objected
on the grounds that the amendment was not germane to the
bill. The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole simply
2 8ruled in favor of the objection. On April 25, Representative 
Jones offered the debenture plan as an amendment. Repre­
sentative Williams objected, alleging that the new issue 
was not germane. The Chairman once again sustained the 
objection. He explained that it was not enough for an
amendment to be on the same topic; it had to follow the
29same idea to be germane. The nature of these decisions
26Ibid., p. 146.
27Ibld., p. 132.
28Ibid., pp. 480-1.
2^Ibid., pp. 564-566.
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by the Chairman clearly underlined the support for the pro­
gram as it had been introduced, and the power that the
supporters had at their disposal.
Those speakers who clearly supported the bill emphasized
the need for immediate relief, the possible flexibility of 
the farm board, and the limited nature of the bill. Repre­
sentative Kincheloe emphasized that the bill hoped only to
30stabilize the marketing situation. Scott Leavitt of
Montana added that the proposal was not designed to be a
universal aid to the farmer, but only specifically to help
31reorganize marketing. Chairman Haugen added in his
extended remarks that the aim was to control and stabilize
marketing. The bill did not call for any specific method,
32leaving the ultimate decision to the board. Haugen had
remarked earlier that the board would be expected to make
the tariff effective by controlling surplus and promoting
33orderly marketing. L.J. Dickinson of Iowa emphasized 
the importance of the board in the price stabilization 
effort.34 Representative Aswell called the board the,
" . . . heart, soul, [and] the life of the measure. The
character, the integrity, and the vision of these six 
men will definitely determine the success or failure of
30Ibid., P- 140 .
31Ibid. , P- 17 8.
32Ibid. , P- 136.
33Ibid., P- 133.
34 Ibid., P- 169.
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this plan.
Not all of the comments on the bill were favorable, 
however. There were expressions of dissatisfaction and 
disappointment sprinkled throughout the discussion. Repre­
sentative Cannon was one of the most outspoken of the 
opponents. He said that the bill was a waste of time and,
"the greatest gold brick ever handed to the American farmer. . .
It fails every major test. It does not make the tariff 
effective. It does not control the surplus. And it makes
7 fl
no provision against over production." Representative
Jones argued that the board might be able to stabilize prices,
but what the farmer really needed was higher prices. The
tariff had allowed other prices to increase, and some plan
37to make the tariff effective on farm products was needed.
Elbert Brigham of Vermont argued that the bill could not
work. He believed that ending crop surplus by cutting pro-
38duction was the only long-range solution. Many Representa­
tives had argued that, if nothing else, this bill was a 
beginning which could be built on later. Ralph Lozier of 
Missouri disagreed and said that he feared that the act was 
actually a, ". . . step backward, a plunge into . . . inaction." 
He knew that the House would not pass any other bill, but
^ lb id., p . 129 .
36lb id. , p. 128. 
3h b i d ., p. 157.
38Ibid., pp. 169-171.
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hoped that the Senate would force a better solution on the 
39lower House.
The power of the forces behind the bill were very
apparent as the bill was read for amendment in the Committee
of the Whole. The process began on April 23 and ended April
25. During the three day period numerous amendments were
proposed, but only three were accepted. Two were editorial
and were approved by the Committee on Agriculture. The
40other was only a very minor change. The bill was reported
out of the Committee and was recommended for final passage on 
41April 2 5.
The original rule governing the course of House Resolu­
tion One called for one motion to recommit the bill to com­
mittee. This motion was made by Representative Cannon and 
was defeated three hundred two to sixty-three. The previous 
question was then ordered, according to the Rule, and the 
bill was passed. The House was divided as follows: yeas,
366; nays, thirty-five; present, two; and not voting, nine- 
4 2teen. Statistical analysis of the results indicated that 
ninety-two per cent of the members voted either for or 
against the measure. Of those Representatives, ninety-one
39Ibid., p. 415.
40Ibid., pp. 542-3,
41ibid., p. 572.
42 Ibid., pp. 572-573. At that time there were four 
vacancies in the House. That left nine Representatives whose 
position was not recorded at this time.
per cent voted in favor of passage, and only nine per cent 
voted against. This landslide victory of the proposal in 
the House revealed how the managers of the, bill were able
43to force it through the process without any major contest.
Examination of the vote by political parties indicated
I
that although there was almost unanimous Republican support
for the measure, there was substantial Democratic support
as well. N'Tn e ty - two per cent of the Republican members voted
in favor of the measure while less than one per cent voted
against. On the Democratic side, seventy-three per cent
voted yes, and twenty per cent voted no. Even more revealing
was the fact that only sixty-seven per cent of the yes
votes were Republican, but ninety four per cent of the no
votes were cast by Democrats. Most of the Republicans who
did not vote for the bill also did not vote against it.
They voted present or did not vote. The Democrats, on the
other hand, who did not vote with the majority, largely
44voted against the bill.
Time announced that the "docile and well pledged" House 
of Representatives had passed the President’s bill. "Fenced 
off with barbed wire of special rules which Kept out all 
amendments including the debenture plan, the measure," it 
continued, "was practically unchanged by eight days of
43 lb id. A statistical analysis of the vote will be 
found in Appendix A.
44 See Appendix A.
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45debate . ” The ‘Omaha Bee -News, on the other hand , praised
the bipartisan support of the measure. In an editorial,
the Nebraska paper believed that the House had acted for
46the farmer instead of against the President. * That comment
previewed much of the criticism which was to be leveled at
the Senate. The range of editorial comment on the House
action was from indignant opposition to warm support.
The New York Times was perhaps warmest in its praise of
the bill. Omission of the equalization fee and the debenture
program was the strongest part of the measure according to
47the New York paper. The Qm ah a B e e-N ews flatly stated that
it favored the administration’s proposal as passed by the 
48House. The rest of the Nebraska editors were more hesitant 
in their reaction to the House version. Those who did favor 
the proposal did so reluctantly. The Kearney Hub supported 
the bill as a foundation which could be built on later. It 
maintained that the bill was worthy of support even though 
it did not do everything for everyone. The editorial con­
cluded, "A hungry man does not refuse half a loaf because he
49is not offered a whole one.”
Much of press reaction, however, was unfavorable to the
^ ’’National Affairs: Husbandry: Senators vs. Hoover” ,
Time, May 6, 19 29, pp. 13-14.
^ Omaha (Nebraska) Bee-News (Morning Ed.), March 17, 1929.
^ New York Times, April 16 , 1929.
4 8
Omaha Bee -N ews, (Morning Edition), April 27, 1929.
^ Kearney (Nebraska) Hub, May 11, 1929.
bill. Several basic problems were cited: the creation of
new bureaucracy, competition with private enterprise, and the 
lack.of.tariff equalization, The Omaha World-Herald particu­
larly raised the last issue. The editor pointed out that, 
stable prices might not he high enough to aid the farmer.
The only way to insure a higher price was to make the tariff 
work for the farmer through the debenture program or equali­
zation fee. The only way to raise prices was to limit pro^ - 
duction,and the World-Herald bitterly opposed that alternative. 
The idea that the activities of the farm board would compete 
with private enterprise was emphasized by the national 
coverage given to a statement issued by the Northwestern 
Grain Dealers. Their annual convention passed a resolution 
which charged that the House version was unfair to their 
interests. They opposed the administration proposal on two 
grounds: first, cheap credit would be readily available to
the cooperatives, but not to grain dealers, and second, 
grain dealers would be taxed to help their competitors.^
The Lincoln Star opposed the House version because of the 
additional bureaucracy it created. This would add to the 
cost of government and not necessarily solve the problem.
The Star believed that marketing reorganization alone would
^ Omaha World-Herald, April 12 and 16, 1929. See also 
the Lincoln Star, June 16, 1929. ,
~^hsFew York Times, April 18 , 1929 and. "National Affairs: 
Husbandry: Houses Divided,"; Time, April 29, 1929, pp. 11-12.
60
5 2 ‘
not aid the farmer. In many ways the Beatrice News sum­
marized the Nebraska press reaction to the House proposal.
Its passage was reluctantly greeted as an advancement. At 
the same time, the editor expressed great doubt if the bill 
would do anything positive for the farmer. The editorial 
concluded, "If the end of ten years sees the success of the
plan, Herbert Hoover will deserve more credit than we fear
53he will ever receive.”
Dispite the cool reception its program received, the 
House had acted. It had voted in a largely bipartisan manner 
for a bill reported to have the blessing of the President. 
Most importantly, it had acted with an overwhelming display 
of strength. The possibility of passing any measure which 
was substantially different from the one already acted upon 
would have seemed remote indeed. There were, however, forces 
growing in the Senate which would pass a bill that was 
drastically different and then would try to force the House 
to accept the new measure.
c o
Lincoln (Nebraska) Star, April 15 and 16, 1929. 
^ B e  a trie e (Nebraska) News, May 2 , 1929.
CHAPTER IV 
THE SENATE 
THE DEBENTURE PLAN
On April 15, 1929, the Senate of the United States 
convened in Special Session to consider farm relief legis­
lation. The upper house met in response to the same call 
which had summoned the House. Forces were already in 
operation which would make the Senate proceedings much 
different from those of the House. The political realities 
of the situation made many Republican Senators believe that 
they could support the Presidents program only if he were 
to clearly ask for help. The Senate Democrats were prepared 
to oppose anything which was connected with Hoover. The 
managers of the administrations program simply did not have 
the voting strength to force their measure through, as they 
did in the House. The first order of business in the Senate, 
as in the House, was to listen to the reading of the 
Presidents message. This was the last time the actions of 
the two houses coincided until they both passed the Agricul­
tural Marketing Act nearly eight weeks later.
The Senate Commi t lee on Agriculture did not present 
their proposal on the first day of the session. In fact, the
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bill was not introduced until April 18, and the Committee did 
not report it back to the Senate until April 23. This lag 
seemed to have had two causes. First, and probably least 
important, the Committee had written a, hill containing the 
export debenture program, and there was a dispute about the
3
right of the Senate to introduce a measure effecting revenue.
The other reason for delay was the Committee’s reluctance to
introduce their bill until the President had issued a state-
2ment about his program for farm relief.
As early as April 11, a group of Senate leaders had pre­
sented the debenture plan to Hoover asking for his comments
and suggestions. The President had agreed to review the plan
3and to advise the Senate Committee of his opinion. For the
next week the Committee was inactive, waiting for the
President’s reply. In the meantime, pressures were growing.
Nearly everyone interested in farm relief was anxious to get
a bill introduced and the legislative process started. The
Committee decided, on April 11., to report the bill with a
provision allowing the farm board to use the debenture program
as one of their optional powers. This decision was partially
based on the knowledge that this proposal would be made o-n
4the floor if it were not included. The Committee would have
^New York Times, April 18, 1929.
^New York Times, April 16, 1929.
^New York' T'imes , April 12 , 1929. The Senators who pre­
sented the plan were McNary, Norbeck, Cooper, Heflin, and Ransdell.
^New York Times, April 17, 1929. ^
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preferred to wait for Hoover’s reply, but they decided that 
they could wait no longer.
Charles McNary of Oregon, chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture, introduced the bill on April 18,
Its descriptive title was, "A bill (S. 1) to establish a 
Federal farm board to aid in orderly marketing and in the 
control and disposition of the surpluses of agricultural 
commodities in interstate and foreign commerce." It was 
assigned to the Committee on Agriculture and Fores^fefya^/
The bill was nearly a carbon copy of the House version. The 
declaration of policy in the opening section emphasized that 
the bill was to deal primarily with marketing. The purpose 
of the bill was two-fold. First, to end price fluctuations 
caused by surpluses, and second, to encourage a, "substantial 
and permanent" betterment of the farm situation.^ The 
details of the bill as developed in the next sections followed 
the House's version closely, but differed slightly in minor 
details. The only major difference in the two bills appeared 
in Section Ten of the Senate's version. It called for the 
export debenture program. The plan was not mandatory but 
could be used at the discretion of the farm board. The 
chairman needed only to notify the Secretary of the Treasury 
to put the plan into effect. The debentures were to be
U.S., Congressional Record, 71st Congress, 1st Session, 
1929, LXXI, part 1, p. 102. Hereafter cited as Congressional 
Record.
®Ibid., p. 360.
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valued at one-half of the tariff rate on :any commodity, and
7they were to be used to pay duties on any imports. This 
small difference engendered nearly two months of political 
fighting between the Senate on one side, and the House, 
allied with the President, on the other.
The press reaction to the introduction of the Senate 
bill was very sparse. What comment there was either 
praised the proposal or charged that inclusion of the deben­
ture program was a political maneuver. The New York Times 
reported that the debenture program had a good base, both 
politically and logically. The Republicans had promised 
tariff equalization, and the Senate measure delivered on 
that promise. The paper, however, held no hope for the 
passage of the measure. It said that the Republican 
leadership had long since learned that it could ignore
g
farmers' demands. The Hastings Daily Tribune supported the 
Senate program. The editor of the Nebraska farming community 
paper argued that the proposed improvements in the marketing 
would be welcome help to the farmer, but the problem was 
larger in scope. A substantial part of the problem was 
world-wide in scope. The debenture program would help solve 
that aspect of the problem, if Congress and the President 
would approve it, but the paper held little hope that the 
measure would pass.^
7Ibid., p . 36 2.
^New York Times, April 24, 19 29.
^Hastings (Nebraska) Tribune, April 27, 1929-.
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Criticism of the Senate proposal centered on the idea
that the debenture plan was simply introduced for political
motives. The Kearney Daily Hub seemed to have been one of
the first papers to make those charges, although, before the
bill was passed, many papers were to join in the chorus. As
early as April 20, the Nebraska paper charged that opposition
to the Presidents program was forming and was "deliberately
10anti-Hoover" in nature. They later charged that the
debenture proposal was not made in an attempt to aid the
farmer, but, ". . . to create an issue . . . that offers
endless discussion . . . "
Introduction of the debenture program seemed to have
forced the President to act. On April 20, Hoover issued a
statement which chastised those who would divide the
Republican ranks. He called for unity under the party 
12platform. On April 21, the President notified Senator
McNary that he would respond to the Senate the next day,
and would submit reports from the Secretaries of Agriculture,
Commerce, and the Treasury. The position of the Administra­
tetion was opposition to the debenture program. When the 
report was released to Senator McNary, it proved to be a 
strong condemnation of the program. Hoover stated,
in
Kearney (Nebraska) Daily Hub, April 20, 1929. 
n T M d .  , April 22, 1929.
^ New York Times, April 20, 19 29.
15ib id., April 21, 1929.
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. . I am convinced that it would bring* disaster to the
American farmer."^ The President then summarized ten 
weaknesses of the program. Debentures, he argued, amounted 
to a subsidy directly from the United States Treasury costing 
over two hundred million dollars per year. The first result 
of the debenture plan, the report maintained, would be a 
gigantic windfall profit to grain dealers and speculators 
without aiding the farmers at all. Grain owned by merchants 
would immediately increase in price, and increased prices 
could not filter to the farmer until the next harvest period. 
Hoover further stated that when the benefit of the program 
reached the farmer, it would stimulate vast over-production 
which would ultimately choke the program. The President 
feared that making export crops more profitable would slow 
down the process of diversification of farming. This, he 
believed, was one of the best long-range solutions. Hoover 
argued that although the debenture plan was optional, the 
farm board would be quickly pressured into using it. The 
President maintained that the subsidy was only indirectly 
beneficial to the farmer. If the farmer received any aid at 
all, it would be reduced by the process of discounting the 
debentures. Furthermore, foreign manufacturers could buy 
their raw materials cheaper than competing American manu­
facturers. In some cases this might have allowed foreign 
competitors to ship goods to the domestic market cheaper than
14Ibid., April 2 1 , 1 9 2 9 .
\
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they could be produced in this country. * In the same vein,
foreign livestock producers could buy their feed cheaper
than domestic stockmen. The relatively higher price of the
American commodities could have resulted in a loss of sales
in foreign markets. The President noted that all countries
considered the export debenture system to be dumping, and most
would certainly retaliate by raising their import duties.
Finally, Hoover argued that the export debenture program
would force a sizeable increase in domestic taxes. The loss
in revenue from the debentures would have to be made-up
through internal taxation. The President concluded that the
program ultimately would not benefit the farmer and would,
” , . . inevitably confuse and minimize the much more far
reaching plan of farm relief, upon the fundamental principles
15of which there has been general agreement.”
The initial press reaction to the President’s message
was largely positive. Most editors seemed convinced by his
arguments. The Kearney Daily Hub stated, ’’President Hoover
cuts the ground completely out from under the debenture plan.
He shows that it would be unscientific, costly, oppressive,
and self-defeating.” The editor went on to praise the
President for acting at this time instead of waiting to veto 
16the proposal. Many other Nebraska editors expressed strong
15
Ibid., and Congressional Record, pp. 367-368. Reports 
from the Secretaries of Commerce, Agriculture and the 
Treasury are to be found in both sources as well.
■^’’The President is Right,” The National Repub lie as 
quoted in the Kearney Daily Hub, April 30”, 1929 . ~
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17opposition to the debenture program. The only negative 
comment came from the editor of the Grand Island Daily 
Independent who noted that the President’s message was a 
contradiction of his earlier position. The Independent 
pointed-out that the President had promised not to dictate 
to Congress, but as soon as any action was taken which was 
not included in the administration program, Hoover reacted
i 18strongly.
The President’s negative reply to the committee put 
considerable pressure on its members. Should they report 
the bill as it had been introduced, or should they delete 
the debenture program? Chairman McNary had been authorized, 
by a previous vote, to report the bill without amendment.
19He chose, however, to submit the bill to the committee again.
The members were split on the issue of the debenture. Eight 
*
favored maintaining it, and six voted to strike it out. The
vote on the entire bill was unanimously favorable, so the
measure was reported out of committee without amendment,
2 0and passage was recommended. The committee submitted
^ S e e  Norfolk (Nebraska) Daily News, April 23, 1929, or 
Wayne (Nebraska) Herald, April 25, 1929.
18Grand Island (Nebraska) Daily Independent, June 13, 1929
1 QNew York Times, April 21, 1929.
2 0Congressional Record, p. 363. There seems to be no 
political or geographic rational for the split vote. The 
Republicans split four to four on the measure while the 
Democrats carried it four to two. The breakdown on either 
side of the vote would indicate no geographic prejudice 
in the outcome.
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a report to the Senate on the bill, which emphasized the need
21for a multi-faceted approach to the farm problem. It
22stated, ” . . . no single measure will suffice. . . The
report concluded that the bill was to strengthen the national
situation regarding surpluses and to bring effective, farmer
23control of marketing.
The debate which followed was nearly always more heated 
than discussion in the House had been. It was not, however, 
appreciably more illuminating. Debate seemed to offer the 
opportunity for various Senators to explain their positions. 
No serious attempt to sway the opinions of other members 
seemed to have been made. In fact, two Senators mentioned 
that the issues had already been decided. Simon Fess of 
Ohio said, ”1 doubt very much whether any vote will be 
changed by anything that is said “by any member on the floor.”
He concluded that a vote taken on that day and two weeks
24from that day would be identical. J. Thomas Heflin of 
Alabama voiced a similar idea. He added that the result,
” . . . is already decreed. It is cut and dried. The
25arrangements have all been made.”
^Congressional Record, pp. 364-36 7
Ibid., P- 364.
Ibid., P- 366 .
Ibid. , P- 731.
Ibid., P- 722 .
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The highlight of the first day of debate was a speech
made by T.H. Caraway of Arkansas. The Senator took the
opportunity to reply to Hoover’s message about the debenture
plan. Carraway took an angry, blustery tack which had strong,
humorous overtones. At one point he remarked, "If anyone can
accept , , , [Hoover’s] reasoning he does not need information
26to have faith." In his discussion of the supporting docu­
ment written by Secretary of Agriculture, Hyde, Carraway 
said, ". . . i f  the Senators will read the statement . . .
before the committee, they will acquit him of having any
2 7information on the subject." The Senator did, however,
ably defend the debenture program. He expressed an idea that
was not often heard during that period, either in Congress
or out. He suggested that the best solution might be to
end the tariff program and put all segments of the economy 
2 8on their own. He argued that as long as the tariff was in 
effect, a program of tariff equalization was needed. The 
Senator personally favored the equalization fee, but was
29willing to accept the debenture plan because it was faster.
He charged that the Administration's program was a political
bill to solve a political problem, and that without the
30debenture program, the whole thing was worthless.
26Ibid., p. 371.
2 7Ibid., p . 37 2.
28 Ibid., p . 372.
29 Ibid., p. 375.
30Ibid., p. 374.
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Many Republican Senators criticized Hoover and his hand­
ling of the entire farm, relief situation. Joseph Robinson of 
Arkansas theorized that if the President had acted more 
promptly, the debenture feature might never have been intro­
duced. He pointed out that the idea was included only after
31a prolonged wait for Hoover’s opinion. Smith Brookhart of 
Iowa was one of the Senators who had been effected the most 
by the President’s stand on the debentures. Brookhart had 
campaigned strongly for Hoover, and had assured the farmer 
that the Republican candidate stood for real farm relief.
The Senator clearly felt betrayed. ’’I had a distinct under­
standing,” he said, ”of what farm relief meant. I went out
in the best of faith I know how to exercise. I believed in
32Herbert Hoover .... The Senator promised, ’’There will
33be a hereafter about all this.” Other Senators from 
farming regions joined Brookhart in his protest. They had 
all supported Hoover and believed that they had received 
nothing for their trouble.^ The only Midwestern Republican 
who was not affected by the President’s position on farm relief 
was Senator Norris who had openly opposed Hoover’s election.
The Senator accused the President of allowing farmers to 
believe, during the campaign, that his administration would
51Ibid., p. 1241 
32Ibid., p. 735.
33Ibld., p. 436.
34See for instance, Congressional Record, pp. 523-525 and
737.
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advocate a strong farm relief measure, then, after the
election, supporting a weak measure.^
The Senate Democrats were also critical of Hoover’s
stand. Pat Harrison of Mississippi echoed Norris’ speech very
accurately and added that the pressure from the administration 
36was mounting. Senator Robinson expanded the idea of Admini­
strative pressure and revealed that some Senators had been
threatened with changes in the tariff schedules if they
37supported the debenture program. The New York Times reported
that some Senators who supported the debenture plan had been
ignored by the President in his consideration of patronage
appointments. The paper reported that Senator W. B. Pine,
a Republican from Oklahoma, had submitted a suggestion for
a position in the Indian Bureau which had been overlooked,
following the Senator’s vote for the debenture plan.
Those Senators who supported the Administration’s
program of market reorganization explained their positions
in several ways. Senator McNary made a curious statement:
’’This bill is of an emergent character. It is designed to
meet a present situation and might be called a short-time
approach to the problem.” He stated that this was not the
38time to evolve a long-range program. The Senator’s
3 SCongressional Record, pp. .733-734. 
36Ibid., pp. 1251-2.
37Ibid., pp. 1249-51.
38Ibid., p. 368.
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position seems contrary to the actual workings of the
President's program. He was later questioned about his
support of the administration's proposal. McNary answered
bluntly, "I stated very plainly that sometimes you must
39forego your own views in order to get legislation." The 
rest of the ideas expressed in the debate in support of the 
administration's proposal were identical to those expressed 
long before the Senate session began. There were a few 
amendments to the bill, but they were mainly minor in 
nature. All-in-all, the Senate seemed to be a forum for be­
ginning a Senator's next campaign. Especially if that
Senator was from a farm state.
The press reaction to the Senate's activity was almost 
universally negative. There were only three Nebraska papers 
that supported the debenture aspect of the proposal, and 
support was somewhat tenuous. The general reaction could be
readily divided into two categories: criticism of the
political motives, and criticism of the debenture plan itself. 
Most papers took the former position, but many considered the 
debenture plan to be most important. Most of the editorials 
followed Hoover's criticisms very closely. They cited, often 
without giving credit, the reasons the President gave Congress 
for his position. Some papers went a bit further. The Omaha 
Bee-News called the plan "fatuous . . . paternalism."^ The
39Ibid., p. 599.
Omaha (Nebraska) Bee-News (Morning-Edition), May 9., 1929.
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Lincoln State Journal commented that the debenture program 
was, "a plan of farm relief for which there exists no demand 
among the farmers and which offers no substantial relief-to 
agriculture, and what is more, stands no chance of being put 
into effect!11^  Those papers that supported the plan 
universally emphasized the f.airness of the debenture system. 
If tariff support was important and justifiable for one 
segment of the economy, then it should be made to work for 
the rest of the economy as well. The Grand Island Daily 
Independent stated that case and speculated that opposition 
to the debenture was based on opposition to rising food 
costs.^ The Hastings Daily Tribune editorially asked, if 
subsidy is wrong for wheat, why is it not wrong for every­
thing else?"^
The charge that support of the debenture plan was 
politically motivated, received a great deal of editorial 
space. Nearly every paper repeated the accusation at one 
time or another. Senators Brookhart and Borah were often 
singled out for specific criticism. The Lincoln State 
Journal suggested that Senator Brookhart should begin to 
think before he made a speech, and further suggested that 
a critical evaluation process would leave the Senator with
^(Lincoln, Nebraska) Evening State Journal, May 13, 1929 
Hereafter cited as State Journal.
^ Grand Island Daily Independent, May 20, 1929.
^ Hastings Daily Tribune, May 11, 19 29.
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44little to say. The Democrats who supported the debentures 
received their share of criticism. Most papers charged that 
their position was dictated entirely by politics.^ The 
Lincoln State Journal was bitterly critical of the Democratic 
proponents of the debenture plan. It argued that the program 
was completely antithetical to party policy, yet many Senators 
supported it anyway. The paper concluded, M . . . party lead­
ership has fallen so low that it has nothing of its own to
offer and it is content with the crumbs that fall from the
46tables of the insurgent Republicans," The over-whelming
press reaction, then, was against the Senatefs attempt to
include the debenture proposal in the farm relief program.
The first real test of the relative strength of the
various groups came when James Watson of Indiana proposed
47an amendment to strike the debenture plan. The amendment
4 8was narrowly defeated forty-seven to forty-four. Analysis 
of the voting revealed that the Republican Senators voted 
three-to-one to strike the debenture section. Nearly ninety 
per cent of the Democrats, on the other hand, voted to keep 
the section in the bill. The strength of the Republican
44 Lincoln Star, June 12, 1929.
^ S e e  Kearney Daily Hub, May 7, 19 29, or Omaha Bee-News 
May 9, 19 29. :
46 State Journal, May 13, 1929.
47Congressional Record, p. 730.
48Ibid., pp. 997-998.
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party was clearly behind' the President. The debenture feature
was saved by the block vote of the Democrats combined with
a few insurgent Republican Senators.
The next major obstacle for the Senate version of the
farm relief program was the vote on final passage. The Senators
concluded their debate and voted on the measure on May 14.
The bill, was approved easily, fifty-six to thirty-nine.^
The majority of the Republican party still voted against the
measure, and ninety-four per cent of the "no” votes were cast
by Republicans. The Democratic block once again solidly
supported the measure. Eighty-five per cent of the Democratic
Senators voted for the bill, and a majority of the "yes" votes
51were cast by Democrats. One of the peculiar things about
these two votes in the Senate was that the whole bill passed
by a larger margin than the debenture feature. Nine
Senators, eight Republicans and a Democrat, voted against
the debenture feature, but for the whole bill. The Grand
Island Daily Independent noted that they were all from farm 
52states. These Senators must have believed that opposition 
to the debenture plan was not as important as getting some 
farm relief passed. It was quite clear the Senate’s version
49 See Appendix B.
50Congressional Record, p. 1296.
51See Appendix B.
5 2Grand Island Daily Independent, May 16, 192 9, and 
Appendix B.
was passed by the solid support of the Democratic wing. The 
insurgent Republicans got most of the attention in the press, 
but the Democrats saved the program.
The Senate, then, had finally completed its version of 
the farm relief program. The process took nearly three weeks 
longer than it had in the House. The differences between 
the two houses were marked. The strong leadership of the 
House was not apparent in the Senate. Neither group in 
the Senate seemed to have any organization or even any 
general plan of attack. The House measure was clearly a 
Republican program. The Senate’s version was carried by 
solid Democratic support.
The opponents had clearly identified themselves: the
Senate majority on one side, with a coalition of the House 
and the Administration on the other. The battle ground be­
came the Conference Committee’s room and the national press. 
The process of resolving the differences between the two 
versions of the bill would take another month. The clash 
of political power that was exercised during the Conference 
period was to force the bill into its final form.
Chapter 5
THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE 
POWER POLITICS
The Conference Committee, which was appointed to 
resolve the differences between the two versions of the 
farm relief bill, proved to be the center of the last 
battle of the Special Session. The political maneuvering, 
however, took place in both Houses of Congress, in the 
national press, in the offices of the President, as well as 
in the committee sessions themselves. The political aspects 
of farm relief came to the front more obviously than they 
had at any other stage of the legislative process. All 
the skill and power of the managers of the President's 
program were ultimately called upon to carry the farm relief 
program to completion.
The House of Representatives had completed its version 
of the bill several days before the Senate. The lower 
house had passed the Administration's version, but the 
Senate had added the debenture program. Although this was 
the only major difference, it was not certain, at that 
point, whether or not the conflict could be- resolved.
The plan of action of the House leadership was not
78
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clear in the early stages of the final struggle. The New
York Times reported that a strong division existed among the
House Democrats on the debenture plan.'*' A sizeable number
of Representatives favored not considering the Senate version
2
of the bill, thereby refusing to approve a conference. The
reason for this position was the argument that the debenture
feature effected the income of the United States and should,
therefore, be considered a revenue measure, which could only
3
be originated in the House. The New York Times reported 
that if the House chose to make an issue of the Constitu­
tionality of the Senate’s action and refused to accept their 
bill, the whole farm relief effort might die. The paper 
speculated that a method of circumventing the deadlock
4would be found to save some part of the entire program.
There were four apparent courses open to the House leaders. 
They could have moved for unanimous consent for a conference, 
which would have been refused. They might have referred the 
Senate bill to the House Committee on Agriculture for action, 
which was not likely. They could have proposed a special 
rule that would gloss over the Constitutional issue. Or, 
they could have flatly refused to accept the Senate version
^New York Times, May 15, 1929.
^Ibid., May 16, 1929.
^’’National Affairs: Husbandry: III Winds,” Time,
May 20, 1929, pp. 9-10.
^New York Times, May 16, 19 29.
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of the measure. The New York Times,believed that the third 
alternative was the most likely.*’ The next day, the Times 
reported that the House managers would, indeed, ask for a 
special rule which would bypass the Constitutional issue and 
send the measure to conference. Pressure from the administra­
tion was considered to be the reason for attempting to ignore 
the Constitutional question.^
On May 17, Bertrand Snell of New York, Chairman of the 
House Rules Committee, rose and presented a resolution which 
was the course of action .decided upon by the leadership of 
the House. The resolution stated that there was a Constitu­
tional question involved with the Senate's version of the 
bill, but existing circumstances were such that the House 
would ignore the question and consider the Senate’s proposal. 
This action, however, was not to be considered a precedent 
in any other situation, present or future. The resolution 
proposed the House accept the Senate's version, but not
accept the Senate's amendment, and agree to the conference
7asked for by the upper house. Representative Snell was the 
principal speaker in favor of the resolution. He reported 
that he personally believed that the Senate's proposal was 
unconstitutional. This remark was greeted by applause from
5 I t> i  d •
6Ibid., May 17, 19 29.
7
U.S., Congressional Record, 71st Congress, 1st Session, 
19 29 , LXXI, pi 1448. Hereafter-cited as Congressional Record.
\
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the other members of the House. He continued by reporting 
that others of "equal ability" believed the opposite. The 
question could have easily provoked argument which might have 
required many months or even years to resolve. Snell con­
cluded that the proposed rule should be adopted and work 
8continued. Time reported that Snell later explained that
a Constitutional argument would not have been understood by
the people who wanted farm relief at once, and that a
9 !compromise was necessary. j
Arguments against the resolution centered on one idea:
the rule gave the members of the House no chance to vote
j
on the debenture plan separately from the rest of the propo­
sal. Eward Pou, of North Carolina, {ranking minority member
(
of the Rules Committee, was first to oppose the measure. He
called it a "steamroller" action which would not be easily
!
accepted by the general public who did not give the House
■ i
any credit for courage anyway. He asked that the debenture
plan be brought to a specific vote.^  Clarence Cannon of
1i
Missouri called the resolution a, "gag rule of the most
1X rarbitrary character . . . ." He cjharged that this was
j
one more example of the power politics which had been used
^Ibid.
q ?
"National Affairs: Husbandry:
1929, pp. 12-13. j
10 'Congressional Record, p. 1448.
11Ibid., p. 1450.
Sick Giant," Time, May 27,
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12since the beginning of the session.
Representative Jones of Texas presented a convincing 
argument concerning the Constitutional question. He main­
tained that the debenture plan was not a revenue measure 
within the definition of the Supreme Court. The court had 
ruled that for the Constitutional prohibition to be in 
effect, the measure had to deal primarily with raising funds.
Since the debenture program was essentially a farm relief
13measure, the Senate could, quite properly, propose it.
The resolution was brought to a vote and passed by a 
14two-to-one margin. The Speaker of the House appointed the 
following Representatives to act as conferees: Gilbert
Haugen of Iowa, Fred Purnell of Indiana, Thomas Williams of 
Illinois, James Aswell of Louisiana, and David Kincheloe of ' 
Kentucky.^
The President of the Senate had previously appointed 
the following to the committee: Charles McNary of Oregon,
George Norris of Nebraska, Arthur Capper of Kansas, Ellison 
Smith of South Carolina, and Joseph Ransdell of Louisiana.^
12Ibid., p. 1451.
■^Ibid., p. 1112. The New York Times editorially con- 
curred with this opinion, arguing that the actual effect of 
the debenture was the expenditure of funds and not actually 
raising money. New York Times, May 16, 1929.
14Congressional Record, p. 1454. The actual vote was 
249 to .119, with 58 Representatives not voting.
15Ibid., p. 1455.
16Ibid., p. 1269.
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These ten Congressmen were charged with the duty of ironing- 
out the differences between the two versions of the farm 
relief proposal. Time reported that farm relief had, "dis­
appeared into the subterranean chambers of the capitol . . ."
and stated that the failure of the debenture plan seemed
certain. Three of the five Senate conferees and all five
17from the House had opposed the program. In short, the
administration forces had packed the Committee.
Comment from the press concerning the Congressional
activity still seemed to be against the Senate’s stand on the
debenture issue. The Omaha Bee-News called for the House to
18stand-up and repudiate the Senate action. The Wayne Herald 
was hopeful that the two houses could agree on something
19that would not hurt the farmer even if it did not help him.
The Kearney Daily Hub predicted that the debenture proposal
20would fail, or that no measure would be passed at all.
The New York Times speculated that the House expected the 
Senate to give-up on the debenture program, and if the 
Senate refused, all farm relief efforts would fail. It also 
predicted that the Senate would use a specific defeat of the 
debenture proposal by the House as a good excuse to abandon
17 "National Affairs: Husbandry: Sick Giant," T ime,
May 27, 1929, pp. 12-13.
1 o
Omaha Bee-News, (Morning Edition), May 17, 1929. 
~^Wayne (Nebraska) Herald, April 25, 1929.
^ Kearney (Nebraska) Daily Hub, May 10, 1929.
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that part of their program. In that way; the Senate could
21insure farm relief legislation and still save face.
The Conference Committee met for the first time on
May 21. The differences were quickly isolated. The House
Conferees insisted that the committee consider the debenture
issue first. The members from the Senate refused to consider
a compromise on the debenture section until the House had
taken a roll call vote on the proposal. The conferees from
the House asked for time to consult their leaders and report 
22back. They reported the next day that there was no change
23in their previous position. The leaders of the House were 
simply unwilling to allow the Senate to dictate procedures 
to them.^ The Committee continued to meet daily until 
May 26, when the Representatives walked-out of the meeting. 
They stated that there was no reason to continue, and that 
the debenture issue was the entire cause of the problem.
The New York Times speculated that this break-down would 
allow Congress to recess and escape from Washington for the 
summer months.^
The demand for some kind of farm relief legislation 
proved to be too strong to allow a recess, however. Pressure
^ New York Times, May 17, and 20, 1929.
2 2Ibid., May 21, 1929. See also, Congressional Record, 
pp. 2 55607.
25Ibid., May 22, 1929.
2^Ibid., May 26, 1929.
had been exerted on all sides to get work under way again.
An action of the Florida legislature was often cited as
representative of the general mood of the country. The
legislature passed a resolution which instructed its Senators
to get on with farm relief and abandon the debenture proposal
The imminent arrival of summer was also cited as a factor in
2 7getting the conference underway again. President Hoover
expressed his opposition to taking a recess until the farm
2 8relief bill was passed. The following day, Congressional
leaders announced that they would not allow the summer recess
29to begin until the farm question was settled.
The Conference resumed on June 2 and compromises were
reached on all contested issues except the debenture program.
The deadlock continued as before. On June 6, the committee
finally reached an agreement which abandoned the debenture
section of the bill. The vote was eight to two with only
31Senators Norris and Smith dessenting. Senator McNary 
explained that the majority of the Senate's Conferees had 
agreed to drop the debenture section because they believed
26Ibid., June 1, 1929. 
27Ibid.
2®Ibid., May 30, 1929. 
29Ibid., June 1, 1929. 
30Ibid., June 2, 1929. 
31Ibid., June 6, 1929.
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that their action would not harm the debenture proposal if 
the Senate wanted to insist upon it. Their decision could 
also have hastened the course of legislation if the Senate 
were willing to abandon the provision. McNary concluded that 
the Representatives on the Committee were completely unwill­
ing to accept the debenture program or recommend a roll call
32vote on the issue.
The Conference Report was presented to the House of
Representatives on June 7. A statement was issued by the
Conferees from the House which explained the changes and
recommended that the compromises be accepted. The report
stressed that the bill was primarily the original House Bill
33with a few minor changes. The question of agreeing to the
34Conference Report was called and the Report was accepted.
The Conference Report was presented to the Senate on 
35June 6. Discussion of the report centered on the refusal
of the House to vote directly on the debenture section.
Claude Swanson of Virginia stated that the Senators who
supported the debentures had the right to force each Repre-
36sentative to make his position known to the public.
32Congressional Record, pp. 2556-2557. 
33Ibid., pp. 2520-2523.
34Ibid. , p. 2531.
3SIbid., p. 2409.
36I b i d . p .  2563.
Senator Norris believed that the Representatives could cam­
paign safely now regardless of their actual feelings on the 
debenture issue. He stated that if the House refused to
accept the debenture provision, he would vote for the bill 
37without it. The question of agreeing to the Conference
Report was called, and the Report was refused. The vote was
3 8forty-three to forty-six with six Senators not voting.
The Senate further resolved to insist on its original version
and to ask for a further conference. The same five Senators
were appointed as conferees.
The New York Times reported that the farm program hung,
"in the balance." The only hope for passing legislation
acceptable to the President was for the House to vote directly
40on the debenture question. The Times charged that the
Senate*s action was politically motivated, and that the
41campaigns of 1930 and 1932 had already begun. The Repub­
lican leadership was made aware of a growing anti-Republican 
trend by a special election which had been held in Kentucky.
In November, the Republican candidate had won the election 
by over four thousand votes. In May, the Democratic candidate 
had won by more than one thousand votes. One of the reasons
37Ibid., p. 2562.
38Ibid., p. 2661.
39Ibid.
40New York Times, June 10, 1929.
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cited for the change was growing disaffection caused by the
42delays in the farm relief program.
After the defeat of the first Conference Report, 
President Hoover assumed the leadership in the fight for farm 
relief legislation. His first action was to release a strong 
statement to the press. He praised the version passed by the 
House as a long-range method of improving the farm situation. 
Hoover stressed that no one had adequately refuted his argu­
ments against the debenture program. The President concluded 
that the Senate had at best delayed action and at worst had 
killed all hope for farm relief.^
Hoover’s second action was to have a conference with 
Congressional leaders. The Senators present were: McNary
of Oregon, James Watson of Indiana, David Reed of Penn­
sylvania, Walter Edge of New Jersey, and George Moses of 
New Hampshire. Speaker Nicholas Longworth of Ohio, Repre­
sentative John Tilson of Connecticut and Representative 
Bertrand Snell of New York were invited from the House of 
Representatives. Hoover was aided by Secretary of Agricul­
ture Hyde, Secretary of War Good, and the President’s 
secretary, Walter H. Newton. Exactly what was said during 
that ninety minute conference was not revealed to the press.
Ibid., June '5, 1929. Another special election was 
held in Minnesota slightly later. The results showed the 
same trend as Kentucky had exhibited, only stronger. 
Lincoln (Nebraska) Star, June 21, 1929.
43Ibid., June 12, 1929.
\
It was apparent that the President was trying to find some
44way to get the farm relief legislation through Congress.
Time reported that Hoover exerted his authority as party
chief and President. He- virtually ordered the leaders of
the House to bring the debenture measure to a vote . ^  A New
York Times editorial had remarked that Hoover’s prestige
had been wounded by the Senate's action. The President had
clearly announced his opposition to the debenture, but his
advice had been ignored. The paper concluded that the House
had to act quickly to rescue the President’s image and
46possibly to save all of Hoover’s legislative program.
The House indeed acted quickly. The next morning,
Representative Haugen moved that the House insist on its
version of the bill and agree to a new conference. John
Tilson of Connecticut offered an amendment which would, if
approved,,instruct the conferees from the House to demand
47the omission of the debenture program. The New York Times
reported that this procedure was agreed upon to meet the
Senate’s demand for a direct, roll call vote on the debenture 
48program. Representative Tilson said that his motion was
45 "National Affairs: The Presidency: Constructive Start,
Time, June 2 4, 1929, p . 11.
46
New York Times, June 12, 1929.
4 7CongressTonal Record, p. 2788.
48New York Times, June 13, 19 29.
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designed to end the controversy over the debenture plan and
that i t ■provided, ” . . . the most direct way and perhaps the
49only way that we can get this bill passed.” The amendment
was accepted, two hundred and fifty to one hundred and 
50thirteen. Statistical analysis of this vote indicated a 
reasonably strict division by political party. Sixty per 
cent of those who actually voted on the measure were Repub­
licans, indicating their majority position. Eighty-seven 
per cent of the ”yes” votes were cast by Republicans, and 
eighty-eight per cent of the "no" votes were recorded by 
Democrats. Eighty-one per cent of the Republican Representa­
tives voted to remove the debenture plan, while sixty-one 
per cent of their Democratic counterparts voted to keep that 
portion of the p r o g r a m . T h e  administration's control over 
the House was clearly demonstrated. The Republican majority 
once again carried the President's program. The House con­
cluded its consideration of the matter by appointing the
52same conferees who had served before.
The New York Times called the vote a "notable” victory 
for President Hoover. The editors reported that the only 
reason that the House had resisted so long was to keep some 
Mid-western Republicans from having to vote against the
49 Congressional Record, p. 2788.
50 j , ,  A Ibid.
^ S e e  Appendix C.
52Congressional Record, p. 27 89.
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5 3debenture program. The 'Omah'a Wo rid - He r a 1 d commented that
the House had uncritically accepted the President’s suggestions.
The Representatives had refused to consider improvements, but
followed directions instead. "That makes the kind of a
legislative body," the Worid-Heraid concluded, "any executive
54can easily learn to love.” The press generally took the 
position that the House had been blocking the legislative 
process by refusing to vote on the debenture issue and expressed
the hope that the Senate would move quickly on the farm relief
. 55 proposal.
The conference began the following morning, June 14.
It was unanimously agreed to resubmit the same report which
had been presented b e f o r e . T h e  Conference Report was filed
with the House as the first order of business. Representative
Haugen simply asked that the report be accepted, and it was,
5 7by voice vote. Senator McNary introduced the Conference
Report to the upper house and asked that it be considered at
5 8the end of that day. His request was also accepted. After 
a minimum amount of debate, the question of agreeing to the
^ N ew York Times, June 14, 1929.
Omaha Morning World-Heraid, June 14, 1929.
*^See for instance, Grand Island (Nebraska) Daily Inde­
pendent , June 10 or 14, 1929 , or Kea'fney Daily Hub~  ^ June 14, 1929.
^ Congressional Record, p. 2781.
Ibid. , p .  2 8 9 4 .
58Ibid., p. 2870.
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report was moved. The report was accepted seventy-four to 
59eight. Statistical analysis of the vote indicated that 
the Republican majority had carried the bill. The Demo­
cratic Senators cast only one-third of the "yes"'votes, They 
did record, however, sixty-three per cent of the "no" votes. 
Nearly sixty per cent, of the total votes actually cast for 
or against the measure were recorded by Republican Senators. 
Curiously enough, the Report received more nearly universal 
support within the Democratic party than within the Repub­
lican. The numerical superiority of the Republicans allowed 
them to claim the bill as a Republican measure.^ This vote 
was a distinct contrast to the earlier returns on the Senate’s 
version of the bill. That measure had been largely carried 
by a solid block of Democratic Senators. The substantial 
Republican support of the Committee Report, coupled with a 
slight Democratic shift against the successful version, 
gave the Senate’s action a definitely Republican flavor.^
The immediate reaction to the passage of the bill was 
contradictory. The McCook Tribune praised the House for not
wavering from the Republican platform, and for its support
6 2of the President. The Grand Island Daily Independent 
attacked the House with equal enthusiasm. It charged that’
Ibid., p. 2886.
^ S e e  Appendix D.
61See Appendixes B and D.
^McCook (Nebraska) Tribune, June 21, 1929.
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the Representatives had played politics *first and placed the
6 3relief question second. The Hastings Daily Tribune stated
that the recent actions of Congress might be an argument
64favoring a unicameral legislature. Dispite the wide varia­
tion of reactions, most papers agreed that the actions of 
Congress had to be considered a definite victory for President 
Hoover.^ Apparently his leadership in the latter stages of 
the process had saved his prestige. Tfine, however, believed 
the President’s victory had been a difficult one. Hoover had 
been forced to give up the idea that the Executive should not 
interfere with Congress. In fact, the President had, ’’very 
definitely interfered, [and] very distinctly dictated.
Immediately after the Conference Report was approved by
both houses, the measure was signed by the Speaker of the
67House and the Vice President of the United States. The 
Committee on Enrolled Bills sent the measure to the President 
that same day, June 1 4 . ^  The next day, Hoover held a 
signing ceremony and made his approval official. The Presi­
dent greeted many Congressional leaders for the event which
^ Grand Island (Nebraska) Daily Independent, June 12, 1929.
^ Hastings (Nebraska) Daily Tribune, June 14, 1929.
^ McCook Tribune, June 21, 1929, or Omaha Morning Worid- 
Herald, June 21, 19 29.
f\f\ -
’’National Affairs: The Presidency; Constructive
Start,” Time, June 24, 1929, p. 11.
f \ 7
Congressional Record, pp. 2886 and 2935.
68Ibid., p. 2977.
was attended by many reporters and extensively recorded by
69press photographers. The President signed his first name
with one pen and his last name with another. He then
presented the pens to Senator McNary and Representative 
70Haugen. Hoover delivered a short speech which concluded:
’’After many years of contention we have at last made a
constructive start at agricultural relief with the most
important measure ever passed by Congress in aid of a single 
71industry.
The national reaction to the passage of the farm relief 
measure seemed, on the balance, to be favorable. Senator 
Arthur Capper of Kansas, in an article written for the New 
York Times, reported that the legislation was a vital 
measure for the farmer. ”It is intended to be for agricul­
ture,” the Senator wrote, ”what the Federal Reserve Act is 
for commerce, what the transportation act is for the rail­
roads, [and] what the protective tariff is for manufacturing 
72and labor.” S. H. Thompson, President of the Farm Bureau 
Federation, hailed the bill as the beginning of a ’’new era 
in farming,” and stated that the bill would bring prosperity
69Senator Watson was reported to have remarked that a 
photographer was the only person in the world who could 
keep four Senators quiet for three minutes. New York Times, 
June 16, 1929.
70
New York Times, June 16, 1929.
72Ibid., June 18, 1929.
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73to the farmer once again. The National Grange was the only 
organization that expressed disappointment over the exclusion 
of the debenture plan. A news release from the Grange stated
that the bill as enacted was not strong enough, and that the
74debenture idea would be heard of again.
The local reaction was mixed. The Lincoln Star pointed 
out that on the same day that Hoover signed the bill, the 
price of wheat on the grain exchange fell. The reason for 
the decline, the paper reported, was a drought-breaking rain 
in the Canadian wheat-growing region. The paper concluded
that the grain dealer had much more faith in rain than the
75government as a factor in wheat prices. The North Platte
Tribune offered a typical criticism when it suggested that
the program was a long-range solution and that the farmer
7 6was in immediate need of aid. The Wayne Herald suggested
that the measure would provide only psychological help in
the short-run. The long-run impact of the program was. com-
77pi etely unknown, the Herald concluded. Much of the comment
stressed the sincere effort on the part of the Administration
and emphasized that the program should be considered an
73Ibid., June 16, 1929.
74Kearney Daily Hub, June 24, 1929.
^ Lincoln Star, June 17, 1929.
^ The North Platte (Nebraska) Tribune, July 12, 19 29.
^ Wayne (Nebraska) Herald, June 20,.1929.
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experiment to be changed or discarded as experience dictated.
The over-all reaction was regarded as cautiously optimistic.
An editorial in the Grand Island Daily Independent, based on
an informal survey of Nebraska newspapers, expressed the
general feeling. It reported that generally the press
supported popular acceptance of the new legislation and calle
for a fair trial period before final conclusions were reached
The Grand Island paper was, ..however,. quite skeptical about
79the potential success of the bill. The Lincoln Sun shared 
the skepticism, but hoped, "that Mr. Hooverfs program suc­
ceeds beyond expectations."^^
The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929 was a reality.
The Federal government had responded to an apparent need.
Its action had been shaped and dictated by the pressure 
groups interested in the solution. The groups with great 
political power influenced the outcome greatly. Those 
groups “with'lesser power had less influence on the outcome. 
This kind of problem-solving apparatus, when faced with a 
complex problem with multiple potential solutions, was 
always subject to question. Did the solution resolve the 
problem?
7 8See, for example, Hastings Daily Tribune, June 13, 
1929, and Evening State Journal ( L i n c o l n ,  Mebraska), June 
25, 1929.
79Grand Island Daily Independent, June 22, 1929.
^^Lincoln Star, June 17, 1929.
Chapter 6
CONCLUSION: ECONOMICS OR POLITICS
The final judgement regarding the potential usefulness 
of the Agricultural Marketing Act in solving the farm problem 
was difficult to reach. There was no real contemporary 
consensus. The history of the Farm Board proved that it did 
not work, but the unusual economic conditions of the early 
thirties might have prevented a system from working at that 
time which could have succeeded under more stable conditions. 
It would seem, therefore, that the potential had not been 
fairly tested. The final decision could be reached only 
after a process of analysis of the economics of agriculture, 
with particular emphasis on the farm problem of the Twenties. 
A concept of what was needed could then be developed, and 
compared with the Agricultural Marketing Act. An analysis 
of the differences between the hypothetical, ideal solution 
and the actual legislation could be made. Finally, sug­
gestions could be offered to account for the differences.
The agricultural industry was in a peculiar economic 
position. First, the farmer sold in a market over which he 
had absolutely no control. Second, he had little ability to 
adjust his production. Third, he sold a product for which
97 \
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the total demand was inelastic. The demand for farm commodi-
1
ties was most significantly related to population. The 
total demand for food was relatively unresponsive to either 
price changes or rising consumer’s income. It has been 
estimated that for every one per cent increase in income, 
the demand for farm commodities only increased one tenth of 
one per cent. In fact, the demand for certain foods decreased 
as income increased. While consumer expenditures for food 
increased as income rose, the major portion of the increase
3
went to pay for packaging and convenience services. The 
farmer, then, operated in a situation in which general 
prosperity was transmitted to him only in limited amounts.
Even without other agricultural problems, the increasing well­
being of the United States during the Twenties could have 
aided the farmer only in greatly diminished portions. Agri­
culture simply could not accrue benefits which other segments 
of the economy enjoyed.
The individual producer had only limited ability to 
adjust his total production. The proportion of his fixed 
costs to variable costs was so high that he was forced to 
produce the maximum amount, regardless of projected demand. 
Although the farmer had some variable costs, the bulk of
1
Earl 0. Heady, A Primer- on Food, Agriculture, and 
Public Policy (New York! Random House, 1967), p\ 97 
Hereafter cited as Heady, Agriculture and Public Policy.
^Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
^Ibid., p . 10.
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his annual expenditures were fixed long in advance by a
4series of mortgage and loan agreements. In this situation, 
the annual income of the typical producer varied a great deal 
more than his annual costs. ** The only factors which really 
affected production were non-economic, and largely uncon­
trollable: weather, insects, and disease.^ This dependence
on uncontrollable factors virtually guaranteed great price
7and income instability. In addition, the farmer was forced 
to continue to make large capital expenditures in order to 
compete with his neighbors. If he failed to increase his 
production as his competitor-neighbors had, he would be 
forced to meet falling prices with a relatively smaller
g
amount of his crop for sale. The only way for the individual 
producer to help himself was to increase his productivity.
When this factor was applied on a national scale, the total 
production increased, and prices fell even more. The 
farmer was caught in a nearly impossible situation. In 
order to maintain his competitive position, he was forced 
to make large expenditures to be amortized over a long period
4 ~Adlowe L. Larson, Agricultural Marketing, (New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951J, p p . 22-23. Hereafter cited as
Larson, Marketing.
^Heady, Agriculture and Public Policy, p. 26.
^Larson, Marketing, p. 22.
7Heady, Agriculture and Public Policy, p. 25.
8 Ibid., p. 56-57.
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of time. The resulting high, fixed costs forced the farmer
to produce the maximum amount each year. The ever-increasing
supply continually depressed the market prices, leaving the
9entire industry in worse condition each year.
The individual producer’s relationship to the commodity 
market placed him in a difficult position. The market was 
one of the last examples of pure capitalism. No individual 
farmer produced enough to have any impact on the market.
He was forced into the position of "price-taker," who could 
sell all or nothing at one, stated p r i c e . T h e  farmer’s 
gross income was equal to the price received, multiplied by 
the quantity sold, minus the marketing costs. Without 
interference from outside of the market, the price was not 
adjustable, but was inversely proportional to the total 
quantity sold. The quantity sold was, to some degree, 
adjustable, but other forces dictated that the maximum 
possible quantity would be produced. Furthermore, as the 
total amount sold increased, the price fell, offsetting 
any potential increase in the farmer’s gross income. The 
cost of marketing was, perhaps, subject to adjustment, but 
only through large-scale a c t i v i t y . T h e  agricultural 
industry was caught in another situation which was largely 
beyond the control of the individual farmer. Only through
^Ibid., p p . 26-28.
^^Ibid., p . 24.
11Larson, Marketing, pp. 42-44.
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massive cooperative activity could the farmer effect his 
gross income. Even then, the potential increase in income 
was small at best, and total income would still be subject 
to large fluctuations.
There were additional forces in operation during the 
Twenties which mutiplied these general agricultural diffi­
culties. The basic problem of the period was over-product­
ion. It was caused by improved farming techniques, shifting 
demand, and the artificial stimulation of production during 
World War I. The result of the surplus had been drastically
lower prices. The problem was worsened by the continually
12rising costs of production and living. Statistics indicated
that during the period from before the war to the early
Twenties, farmer's taxes had increased 126 per cent, farm
mortgage debt had increased 132 per cent, freight rates had
risen steadily, and farm wages had increased 115 per cent.
Wholesale prices of non-agricultural products had increased
by seventy-two per cent from their pre-war level. At the
same time, the dollar value of all farm products had increased
13by only twenty-two per cent. The increased commercialization
Murray Reed Benedict, Farm Policies of the U . S.: 1790-
1950 (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 195 3), p p . 236-237,
hereafter cited as Benedict, Policies, and George Frederick 
Warren and F. A. Pearson, The Agricultural Situation,
Economics of Fluctuating Prices (New York: J~. Wiley and Sons,
Inc. , 19 24), pp^ 19-21 and p. T, hereafter cited as Warren 
and Pearson, Fluctuating Prices.
13Warren and Pearson, Fluctuating Prices, p. 1.
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of farming, accompanied by increasing dependency on outside 
goods, made the farmer even more at the mercy of rising 
costs.^  The farmer seemed to be suffering from-his enthu­
siastic response to the unusual demand created by World War 
I. He bought land and equipment to meet the demand. When 
the economy readjusted to normal following the war, the 
farmer was left with the capacity to produce at the emergency 
level, and the economic necessity to use that capacity.
In order to develop a concept of what might have been
done for the farmer in 1929, it was necessary to examine the
types of policies available. Agricultural economist Earl 0. .
Heady wrote that there were three general types: compensa-
15tional, developmental, and regulatory. The latter were 
designed to protect the health and welfare of the consumer, 
and did not seem applicable to the situation of the Twenties. 
The Congress of the United States had instituted develop­
mental programs from its beginning. The earliest stages of 
the developmental policy featured cheap land, and the 
Homestead Act was the evolutionary result. As the public 
land was used-up, Congress shifted emphasis and began to 
support an agricultural policy which featured research and 
education programs.^ Then, as agriculture began to shift
14Ibid., pp. 26-27.
15Heady, Agriculture and Public Policy, p . 48.
16 Ibid. Such programs as the Land Grant Colleges, the 
creation of the Department of Agriculture, the Hatch Act, the 
Smith-Lever Act, and the Smith-Hughes Act were cited by Heady 
as examples of this phase. ^
from labor-intensive toward capital-intensive, the policy
began to provide credit designed especially for agricultural 
17needs. These developmental policies were so successful that
early in the Twenties the new problem of surpluses was created.
From that point on, any further efforts of a developmental
18nature benefited only the.consumer, not the farmer. The
first responses to over-production were attempts at self-
help. These largely failed because of the scope of the
problem. The demand for governmental assistance grew, and
19the idea of a compensational policy evolved. The aims of 
this new policy were to offset the effects of the develop­
mental policy, and to pay the farmer compensation for low 
20prices. The result of this new emphasis was to treat the
effects of the problem without attempting to solve them.
Compensation did not impose any permanent readjustment in
21the agricultural sector of the economy. Heady/argued that
any permanent solution had to, ". . . require or encourage
a shift in the farm resource mix to a richer proportion of 
capital, a greater reliance on management, a numerically 
smaller labor force, and larger and fewer farms.” These
17 Ibid. Programs like the Farm Loan Act, the Federal 
Land Bank System, and the Federal Intermediate Credit banks 
were cited as examples of this phase.
18Ibid., pp. 56-57.
19Ibid., pp. 58-59.
^9Ibid., pp. 59-60.
Ibid.
104
changes were necessary to allow agriculture to take advantage
of economies of scale, and return adequate rewards to those
22farmers remaining. Another agricultural economist pointed-
out that the least productive one-third of the American farms
2 3produced only four per cent of the total output. The 
relatively high proportion of low-production farms would 
indicate that Heady’s analysis was probably correct.
The ideal solution would have been one which would have 
sought a permanent, long-range end to the farm problem; a 
solution which could have ultimately resulted in a self- 
sufficient, healthy industry. This far-reaching program 
could logically have been accompanied by a short-run com­
pensation program which would have aided the industry during 
the transitional period. Professor John D. Black of Harvard 
University outlined this concept before the House and 
Senate Committees on Agriculture. He testified that 
production was out of proportion to population and that a
long-range adjustment of production had to be undertaken.
/
Black proposed a program of tariff adjustment schemes as a 
means of easing the problem, while long-range solutions were
24
evolved and put into effect. The Professor’s analysis of 
the situation and proposals would seem to have been the
22Ibid., p. 41.
2 3Larson, Marketing, p. 26.
^ S e e  Chapter II for a more detailed discussion of Dr. 
Black’s testimony.
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soundest presented to the Committees.
The Agricultural Marketing Act was clearly a compensation 
2 5program. There was nothing in the bill which would force
or encourage any adjustment of production to current demand.
It must have been considered, therefore, a temporary solution,
one which would be effective until a more permanent program
was evolved. Even as a short-range solution, the validity
of the new program must have been questioned. The lack of
any provision to control production was a serious defect.
It insured that any slight price rise would be greeted by
increases in supply. Growing surpluses would guarantee that
the five hundred million dollars would be too small a sum to
2 6stabilize the markets and raise prices. Few contemporary 
sources voiced this opinion. One exception was the Lincoln 
Star which was very critical of the new program. It stated 
that the problem was not marketing, but surplus. The editor 
argued that the best marketing system could not digest two 
hundred million bushels of surplus wheat per year and still 
raise prices. The Star concluded that if any program was to 
be valuable in the long-run, "It must deal with the surplus.
27
The sane, simple and economic way is to avoid creating it.”
The drastic changes in the non-agricultural segments of 
the American economy in late-1929 insured the failure of the
25Heady, Agriculture and Public Policy, p. 59.
26T, . ,Ibid.
^ Lincoln (Nebraska) Star, July 1, 1929 .
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Agricultural Marketing Act. The Farm Board had been created
to function modestly in normal times, and not as a tool for
emergency use. When the total economic climate got worse,
28the experiment was doomed. As it became apparent that the
Federal Farm Board was failing, it was rejected by the public.
Funds were exhausted, and the board became inactive. Finally,
2 9on May 26, 1933, the Agricultural Marketing Act was repealed.
Its failure, however, should not be attributed entirely to
the non-agricultural situation. Farmers produced record-
breaking crops during the active period of the Farm Board.
The expense of buying and storing the surpluses actually
30exhausted the financial capacity of the program. The over^alT 
economic situation probably only hastened an inevitable result.
If the Agricultural Marketing Act could not solve the 
farm problem and had little chance of easing the interim* 
period, why was it passed? The final form of this piece of 
legislation was determined by at least four factors: the
nature of the democratic process, conflicting interests, 
tradition, and a general over-simplification of the problem.
The combination of these factors in this situation produced 
the weak solution.
The farm problem was over-simplified by nearly every
7 P
Benedict, Policies, p. 257. -
^ Ibid., p. 264.
30 "Farm States Rage at the Farm Board," Literary Digest, 
July 18, 1931, pp. 8-9.
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interested group. It was most often narrowly defined as a
problem of price or income level, to the exclusion of any 
31other aspect. The root of the problem, overproduction,
was seldom mentioned in Congress or the press. When it was
discussed, it was often viewed as a temporary, adjustment
32type of problem. In fact, many people rejected the idea
33of surplus control as foolish, dangerous, or unconstitutional. 
Refusal to accept surplus production as a major factor of the 
problem and surplus control as a potential solution, may 
have been caused by two things. First, the ability to pro­
duce consistant annual surpluses was quite new and might 
reasonably have been misunderstood. Prior to the Twenties, 
surpluses were temporary and could be absorbed within a few 
years. The fact that the imbalance of production was not 
cyclical was not widely recognized. Secondly, if there were 
a chronic surplus problem, there must also be a surplus of 
farmers and farm capacity as well. To recognize the former,
dictated the recognition of the latter. The exodus of
34farmers to the city was already considered critical. To 
have suggested that this flow should have increased would
31See for instance, U.S. Congress, House Committee on 
Agriculture, Hearings on Agricultural Relief, 71st Congress, 
1st Session, 1929, p. 238.
3 2See, for instance, Senate, Hearings, p . 21.
See, for instance, Senate, Hearings, pp. 21, 33, 532, or
House Hearings, p. 690.
^See, for instance, Senate, Hearings, p. 532, or Nebraska
News-Press ( Nebraska City, Nebraska), May 30, 1929.
A
108
have been heresy. Oversimplification of the problem, for 
whatever reason, caused attention to be focused on the symptom, 
low prices, instead of the cause, surplus production.
The second major obstacle in creating a strong solution 
to the farm problem was tradition. The role of tradition in 
any democratic problem-solving situation cannot be overstated. 
The beliefs, prejudices, and expectations of everyone con­
cerned with the problem dictated the form of the final solu- 
35tion. Tradition moulded thinking about the farm problem in 
many different ways. One of the most basic ideas in nearly 
everyone’s thinking was that the life of the rural citizen 
was somehow better than that of his urban counter-part. Rural 
life was to be protected at any cost. Professor Edwin R. A. 
Seligman expressed this idea most succinctly: ’’The farmer 
must not only be preserved from approaching the status of 
the European peasant, but he must maintain his position as
7 fi
the fountain head of American energy.” This prejudice also 
prevented serious consideration of proposals which would have 
utilized production limitations or would have increased the 
migration to the cities.
35For an excellent discussion of this topic see: Glynn
McBride, "Foundation and Purpose of Public Policy in Agricul­
tural Markets,” Agricultural Market Analysis, Development, 
Performance, Process, ed. Vernon L. Sorenson (East Lansing, 
Michigan: Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Graduate
School of Business Administration, 1964), pp. 26S-274 .
7/: ^
See footnote 69 in Chapter II. This same theme was 
followed in an editorial in the Norfolk (Nebraska) Daily 
News, April 16, 1929.
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Another area where tradition affected thinking about the
farm problem was the tariff policy. Benefits derived by the
farmer from the tariff were tenuous at best. They were based
on the argument that prosperity was brought,to the industrial
sector of the economy by the tariff. This brought general
prosperity to the United States and* thereby, to the farmer.
The farmer was harmed to the extent that he bought products
at a higher price than would have prevailed without the tariff.
Economic experts could not agree whether the tariff was
financially beneficial or harmful to the farmer. One expert
concluded that the problem was so intangible that it was
37impossible to assess. Most farmers seem to have believed
that the tariff was harmful to their personal interests.^
At the same time, many farmers supported the tariff as a
39guarantee of general prosperity. This situation caused a
great deal of attention to be focused on tariff equalization
schemes which were of questionable, short-range benefit and
40did nothing to solve the long-range problem.
Tradition further hampered the problem-solving process
37Edwin R. A. Seligman, The Economics of Farm Relief (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1929), pp. 209-210.
38See, for instance, Kearney (Nebraska)Daily Hub, April 29, 
1929, or Hastings (Nebraska) Daily Tribune, May 11, 1929.
39See, for instance, The Lincoln (Nebraska) Star, May 11,
19 29, or the Hastings Daily Tribune, May 1.1 , 19 29.
^ F o r  an excellent discussion of the tariff as it applied 
to the farmer, see the testimony of Dudley Roe of Maryland. 
House, Hearings, pp. 352-364.
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by limiting the solution to the common conception of the role
of government. Nothing could be done which seemed to break
the ideal of non-interference with the economic system or
private matters. The issues of paternalism and over-extension
41of government powers were raised many times. The idea of
production limitations was particularly attacked as being
outside of traditional boundaries. Senator J. Thomas Heflin
of Alabama even stated that acreage controls were unconstitu- 
42
tional. Tradition, then, excluded from consideration in 1929 ,
many ideas which ultimately formed the basis of legislation.
*
The over-all impact was to force the problem-solvers to choose 
solutions from within certain acceptable limits which were 
determined by social considerations. Any idea outside of 
tradition had no chance of being transformed into legislation.
The third major factor which determined the form of the 
Agricultural Marketing Act was the conflict of interests 
involved in the problem-solving process. There were conflicts 
within the agricultural industry as well as between various 
farming interests and other segments of the economy. The fact 
that a successful solution to the farmers' problems would have 
raised the price of his product caused conflicts with outside 
interests. An increase in the cost of food or raw materials 
was not going to be widely accepted outside of the agricultural
41See, for instance, Oma h a Be e - New s , May 9, 19 29. 
^Senate, Hearings, p . 33 .
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43segment of the economy. The obviously depressed state of
agriculture with the-accompanying loss of purchasing power
lessened the impact of any great rebellion against farm
relief. Any measure which would make the American farmer
into a consumer would have been happily accepted in many 
44areas.
Conflicts within the agricultural industry were probably
more damaging, because they split the united front which could
have been presented. Many farmers were commercial consumers
of agricultural commodities. For instance, the livestock
feeder bought grain from other farmers. Any part of the farm
relief program which aided the grain farmer raised the costs
45of the stockman. This kind of problem was common within 
the industry and undoubtedly made the passage of useful 
legislation more difficult. It certainly made the passage 
of any one-dimensional program nearly impossible. The 
general result of conflict of interests was to make the 
course of legislation more complex. Conflicts between
43This feeling was strongly expressed on the Nebraska 
editorial pages. See, for instance, Hastings Daily Tribune, 
April 2 7,. 1929, or Nebraska News-Press, (Nebraska City, 
Nebraska) March 2 0, 1929.
44 See, for instance, Senate, Hearings, p. 532. The 
ambivalent position which some industries were in, was. 
illustrated by the testimony of Robert Amory, who repre­
sented three cotton manufacturers in Massachusetts. House, 
Hearings, pp. 521-5 33. _
45The same type of conflict arose around all types of 
livestock feed. See, Norfolk Daily News, March 25, 1929.
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agriculture and other segements of the economy created auto­
matic opposition to any program. Conflicts within the 
industry diluted the impact of the farm vote and engendered 
feelings ranging from indifference to hostility.
The final factor which shaped the form of the Agricultural 
Marketing Act was the nature of the democratic process. The 
problem-solving apparatus tended to be dominated by a large 
number of limited-interest groups. A solution could only be 
enacted when enough of these groups to form a majority could 
agree on one solution. The multiplicity of groups and the 
diversity of their interests tended to force legislation to 
be the simplest and least effective possible measure. Common 
ground had to be found which a majority of these interest 
groups could accept. This forced the groups who were most 
directly interested in the solution to propose legislation 
which was hopefully strong enough to solve the problem, yet 
weak enough to invite enough support to insure its passage. 
Once the common ground had been delineated by the legislative 
processes,the bill was quickly passed.
In conclusion, the Agricultural Marketing Act could not 
have been considered an attempt to solve the long-range farm 
problems. It made no mandatory adjustments which could 
ultimately solve the problem. At the same time, its potential 
value as a short-range, transitional solution must have been 
seriously questioned. The ability of the Federal Farm Board 
to raise prices, or stabilize them, must have been considered
\
limited at best. It was suggested that the weakness of this 
act resulted from a combination of factors which were almost 
completely outside of the control of the farmers. A solution 
which might ultimately have solved the farm problem could 
have only been evolved at a time when all of these factors 
aligned themselves perfectly. The Special Session of Congress 
in 1929 was.not that time.
APPENDIX A
Statistical analysis of vote on House Resolution 1
All responses by political party.
Total Rep. Deni.
Farm
labor
Ye s 1366 246 - 119
No 35 2 33
Present 2 2
Not Accounted For 9 3 6
Not Voting 19 14 5
Vacant 4
Total 4 35 267 163 1
Distribution of 
within each
responses w 
political
ithin the 
party by
whole Hou 
percentage
se and
All
Members Rep. Dem.
Farm
labor
Yes 84.0 92.0 73.0 100
No 8.0 0.8 20 .1
Not Voting 4.4 5.2 3.0
Voting Present 0.5 0.8
Not Accounted for 2.1 1.1 3.7
Vacant 1.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
*U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 71st Congress, 1st. 
Session, 1929, LXXI, part 1, pp. 572-573, and U.S. Congress, 
Congressional Directory, 71st Congress, 1st. Session, 1929, 
pp. 137-144.
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Distribution of vote by political party within 
each response by percentage.
R_ep^ _ Dem.
Farm
Labor Total
Yes 67 33 0 ,3 100 .3
No 6 94 100
Not Voting 74 26 100
Present 100 100
Not Accounted for 33 67 100
Relative size of all groups actually voting for 
or against the measure by percentage.
Rep. Dem.
Farm
Labor Total
Yes 61.4 29.7 0.2 91.3
No 0.5 8.2 8.7
Total 61.9 37 .9 0.2 100.0
APPENDIX B
Statistical analysis of vote to strike the debenture 
proposal from S. 1, and vote on whole S. 1.*
All responses by political party of vote to strike 
debenture proposal from S. 1.
Rep.
Farm
TotalDem. Labor
Yes 42 ...... 2 44
No 13 34 47
Paired ..... 3.... 1 4
Not Voting ...... 1 1
Total 56 39 1 * 96
Distribution of responses within the Senate and 
within each political party on vote to strike 
debenture proposal from S. 1 by percentage.
Farm
LaborSenate Rep. Dem.
Ye s 46 75 5
No .... 49 23 87
Not Voting 4 - 8 100
Not Accounted for 1 2....
Total 100 100 100 100
*U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 71st Congress, 1st 
Session, 1929, LXXI, part 1, pp. 997-998 and 1269. U.S. 
Congress, Congressiona1 Directory, 71st Congress, 1st 
Session, 1929, pp. 135-136.
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Distribution of political party membership within each 
reaction on vote to strike debenture proposal 
from S. 1. by percentage.
1---- - -------------------111 Rep. Dem.
Farm
Labor Total
. Yes
95 ..... 5 ' 100
No 28 72 . 100
Not Voting 7 5 25 100
Not Accounted for TOO 100
Relative size of groups actually voting yes or no
on motion to strike the debenture proposal 
from S. 1 by percentage.
& CD V Dem.
Farm
Labor Total
Yes 46 ..... 2 48
•*-
No 14 37 51
Total 60 39 99
All responses by political party of 
vote on S. 1.
Rep. D em.
Farm
Labor Total
Yes 21 33 54
No 31 2 33
Paired 3 4 8
Not recorded 1 1 1
Total 56 39 1 96
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Distribution of responses within the Senate and within 
each political party on vote on S. 1 by percentage.
.... Dem.
Farm
LaborSenate Rep.
85Yes 56 3 7
> •
No . . .  3 4 - ■ 5 5 5
100Not Voting 8 6 10
Not Recorded 1 ..... 2 0
100Total 99 100 100
Distribution of political party membership within each 
reaction on vote on S. 1 by percentage.
Rep. Dem.
Farm
Labor Total
Yes 39 61 100
No 94 6 100
100Not Voting ..... 37 ' 50 13
100Not Recorded 100
Relative size
c
of groups 
in S. 1 by
actually voting yes 
percentage.
or no
Rep. Dem.
F arm 
Labor Total
Yes 6224 38
No 36 2 38
Total 60 40 100
APPENDIX C
Statistical analysis of final vote on Conference Report 
in the Senate and the vote to strike the 
debenture section in the House.*
All responses by political party of final vote on 
Conference Report in the Senate.
Farm
TotalRep. Dem. Labor
Yes 47 27 7 4
8No 3 5
Not Voting 5 7 1 13
Not Recorded 1 Q 1
96Total 56 39 1
Distribution of responses within the Senate and within 
each political party by percentage on final vote 
on Conference Report in the Senate.
Rep. Dem.
Farm
Labor Total
Yes 84 69 100 77
No 5 13 8
Not Voting 9 18 14
Not Recorded 2 1
Total 100 100 100 100
*U.S. Congress, Congress ional Record, 71st Congress, 1st 
Session, 1929, LXXI, p. 2886 and pp. 2788-2789, and U.S. 
Congress, Congress ional Directory, 71st Congress, 1st 
Session, 1929, pp. 135-144.
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Distribution of vote by political phrty within each 
response by percentage on final vote on the 
Conference Report in the Senate.
Rep. Dem.
Farm
Labor Total
Yes 64 36 100
No ...... 37 63 10 0
Not Voting 38 54 ' 8 100
Not Recorded 100 100
Relative size of all groups actually voting for or against 
the Conference Report in the Senate by percentage.
& CD Dem.
Farm 
Labo r Total
90Yes 57 3 3
No 4 6 10
Total 61 39 100
All responses, by political party, on vote to strike 
the debenture section from House Bill.*
' Total Rep. Dem.
Farm
Labor
Yes 250 217 33 i
No 113 13 100
Present ...... 2 ..... 1 1
Not Voting 64 35 28 1
Not Recorded 3 2 1
Vacant ....... 3
Total 4 35 268 16 3 1
*There is a discrepancy in the Congressional Record on this vote. 
In the text, the "not voting" total was reported as sixty-five. 
However, only sixty-four names were listed in that category.
This table, and those following, were prepared assuming that 
sixty-four was the correct figure.
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Distribution of responses within the House and each 
political party on the final vote to strike the 
debenture section from the House Bill 
by percentage.
Farm
LaborAll Rep. Dem.
Yes 57 ' .... 81 20
No 26 5 61
Present 0.5 0. 4 0.6
Not Voting 15 13 17 100
Not Recorded 0.7 0.7 0.6
Vacant 0.7
Total 100 100 100 100
Distribution of vote by political party within each 
response on the final vote to strike the 
debenture section from the House 
Bill by percentage.
Rep. Dem.
Farm
Labor Total
Yes 87 13 100
No 12 88 100
Present 50 50 100
Not Voting 55 44 1.6 100
Not Recorded 67 33 100
Relative size of all groups actually voting for or against 
striking the debenture section from the 
House Bill by percentage.
Rep. Dem.
Farm
Labor Total
Yes 60 9 69
No 3 28 31
Total 63 37 „....: J 100
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